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HOSTILE  TAKEOVERS  invite strong reactions, both positive and negative, 
from academics  as well  as the general public.  Yet fairly little is known 
about what drives these takeovers,  which characteristically involve  sig- 
nificant wealth gains to target firms' shareholders. The question is where 
these  wealth gains come  from. 
We examine  the sample of all 62 hostile  takeover contests between 
1984 and 1986 that involved  a purchase price of $50 million  or more. 
In these  contests,  50 targets were acquired and 12 remained indepen- 
dent.  We use a sample of hostile  takeovers exclusively  to avoid using 
evidence  from  friendly  acquisitions  to judge  hostile  ones,  as  many 
studies have done. We examine such post-takeover operational changes 
as divestitures,  layoffs,  tax savings,  and investment cuts to understand 
how  the bidding  firm could justify  paying  the takeover premium.  We 
also examine  the possibility  of wealth losses  by bidding firms' stock- 
holders as the explanation  for target shareholder gains. 
The analysis  of post-takeover  changes  is complicated  because  once 
the target and the bidding firms are merged,  it becomes  impossible  to 
attribute to the target the changes recorded in joint accounting data. As 
a consequence,  we do not use such data, but rather focus on discussion 
in annual reports,  1OK forms,  newspapers,  magazines,  Moody's  and 
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Value Line reports, and other such sources.  Our approach is similar to 
the  one  recently  employed  by  Bhide  (1989).  The  advantage  of  this 
design is that we can attribute the changes we examine,  such as layoffs 
and selloffs,  to the target firm. The disadvantage  is that most changes 
we examine  are biased  downward because  some may not be reported. 
Our calculations  suggest  that,  on  average,  taxes  and layoffs  each 
explain  a moderate fraction of the takeover premium.  Layoffs,  which 
disproportionately  affect  high-level  white-collar  employees,  explain 
perhaps 10-20  percent of the average premium, although in a few cases 
they  are the  whole  story.  Tax  savings  are usually  somewhat  smaller 
than  savings  from  layoffs  (although  they  are significant  in  a larger 
number of  cases),  since  debt  is  typically  repaid fairly  fast.  But  tax 
reductions are very large in management buyouts,  acquisitions by part- 
nerships,  and acquisitions  by firms with tax losses.  Large investment 
cuts  occur  infrequently  in  our  sample,  and do  not  appear to  be  an 
important takeover motive.  Wealth declines of the bidding firms' share- 
holders,  similarly,  while  important in a few  cases,  are usually  small 
and cannot be a systematic  source of target shareholders'  gains. 
Our most  significant  finding  is  that most  hostile  takeover  activity 
results  in allocation  of  assets  to firms in the same industries as those 
assets. In most hostile takeovers, the bidding firm is in the same business 
as,  or a business  closely  related to,  that of the target firm. Similarly, 
the majority of  selloffs,  which  amount to 30  percent of the acquired 
assets,  are to buyers  in the same business  as the assets  they acquire. 
Overall,  of  the  assets  that changed  hands in our sample,  72  percent 
ended up owned by corporations with other similar assets. By and large, 
hostile takeovers represent the deconglomeration  of American business 
and a return to corporate specialization. 
These findings have significant implications for explaining the sources 
of gains in hostile  takeovers.  First, they suggest that the places to look 
for the gains  are cost  savings  from joint operations,  market power,  or 
possibly  overpayment  by  buyers  of  divisions  and whole  companies. 
Some of these gains might be from eventual layoffs  that we document, 
but others we might not be able to capture. In any event,  changes that 
result from consolidation  of  industries are essential  for understanding 
takeover  gains.  Second,  the findings  suggest  that incentive-intensive 
organizations,  such as management buyout teams,  investment compa- 
nies,  or raiders, are not very important in the long run. In our sample, Sanjai  Bhagat,  Andrei  Shleifer,  and Robert  Vishtny  3 
only  20 percent of  the assets  ended up under control of  such organi- 
zations after two to three years, and this fraction would surely dwindle 
if  we looked  at the assets  over a longer period.  Control by raiders or 
by MBO teams is often a transitory arrangement used to allocate assets 
to corporations managing other similar assets. 
Potential Sources of Takeover Gains 
What is the source of target shareholders' gains in hostile takeovers? 
The  literature offers  a wealth  of  theories  of  the  sources  of  takeover 
gains in general.  One possibility  is simply that the stock market under- 
prices the target, so that no operational changes are actually needed for 
the bidder to  profit from  the  acquisition.  Another possibility  is  that 
bidding  firms overpay  for their targets,  perhaps because  acquisitions 
serve the objectives  of managers and not of shareholders. In these cases 
the target shareholders' gains are the bidding shareholders' losses.  Con- 
sistent with this view  is the evidence  of David Ravenscraft and F.  M. 
Scherer that the earnings of  acquired lines  of business  in the friendly 
takeovers  of the  1960s  and 1970s  did not rise.1 
Although underpricing and bidder overpayment might be important, 
they are probably not the whole story in hostile takeovers. For example, 
Steven Kaplan shows  that cash flow (net of capital expenditures) rises 
significantly  in his sample of LBOs.2 Moreover,  substantial anecdotal 
evidence  also  indicates  that hostile  takeovers  are followed  by  large 
operational changes  in many firms. Accordingly,  we first deal with the 
role of wealth changes in bidding firms' shareholders, and then describe 
some potentially important changes that can justify takeover premiums, 
as well  as discuss  how these sources fit into existing  takeover theories. 
Wealth Change of Bidding Shareholders 
Target shareholders in hostile takeovers clearly gain significant wealth, 
but less is known about bidding shareholders. If they gain as well,  then 
the analysis of operational changes must come up with greater savings 
1.  Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987). 
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to account for the wealth gains.  If,  on the other hand, bidding share- 
holders lose,  a smaller shareholder wealth increase is left to explain. 
Many argue that competition  between  actual and potential bidders, 
as well  as the ability  of  target shareholders to  "free  ride"  on gains, 
ensures that most of  the gains  in takeovers accrue to the target firm's 
shareholders.  Bidding  shareholders gain from a takeover to the extent 
that there  is  a component  to  the  value  gain  that is  not  lost  through 
competition  and cannot be appropriated by target shareholders.  Such 
bidder gains might be particularly large when the bidder and the target 
are in the same industry, and special opportunities to the given merger 
are not  available  to  other bidders.  Considerable  evidence,  however, 
shows  that many mergers are driven by managerial rather than share- 
holder objectives,  which make bidding firms willing  to overpay for the 
acquisition  targets.  Overpayment,  of course,  leads to negative returns 
to bidding  shareholders. 
The evidence is that the bidders just about break even, but the findings 
vary by time  period  and the type of  acquisition.  No  studies  examine 
bidder returns in hostile  takeovers; the only proxy for such evidence  is 
the finding for tender offers.  In the 1980s,  bidders in tender offers lost 
small amounts of wealth on average.3 This evidence  suggests that many 
acquisitions  are driven  by  the objectives  of  managers rather than of 
shareholders,  so that managers are willing  to overpay for the targets to 
pursue their own  goals.  In a sample  of  mostly  friendly  acquisitions, 
Randall Morck,  Andrei Shleifer,  and Robert Vishny  find that bidding 
shareholders are more likely to lose when acquisitions serve managerial 
objectives,  such as diversification  and pursuit of growth.4 Since  there 
are many "strategic" acquisitions in our sample, we examine the changes 
in the wealth of bidding  shareholders as one potential source of gains 
of the target firms' shareholders. 
Strategic  Acquisitions 
As  noted,  hostile  takeovers  often  involve  the acquisitions  of  firms 
closely  related to the bidding firm. Gains from related acquisitions  are 
likely  to come  from operating efficiencies  (either pure efficiency  gains 
or wealth transfers) or from increased market power. Gains from market 
3.  Bradley, Desai,  and Kim (1988). 
4.  Morck, Shleifer,  and Vishny (1990). Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  5 
power  are commonly  believed  to have  driven the horizontal  mergers 
preceding  World War  II, before the strict antitrust enforcement of the 
1960s and 1970s made such mergers more difficult.5 With the relaxation 
of  antitrust enforcement  during the  1980s,  many horizontal combina- 
tions once  again became  possible.  Some  argue that the gains in some 
strategic acquisitions  come from this ability to restrict output and raise 
price. 
Some  evidence  on the importance of such acquisitions  comes  from 
the findings of Espen Eckbo and Robert Stillman that competitors' stock 
prices rise when horizontal mergers are announced, consistent with the 
simple model of declining competition.6 However,  stock prices of com- 
petitors do not rise nearly as much as those of the target, as a simple 
oligopoly  model would predict. Furthermore, competitors'  stock prices 
sometimes  also rise when the government challenges  the initial merger, 
which  seems  contrary to the oligopoly  theory.  Although this evidence 
is  still  being  debated,  it suggests  that market power is not the whole 
story. 
Joint operating efficiencies  might come from combining research and 
development,  procurement,  distribution,  marketing, and headquarters 
operations.  Some of these operating efficiencies  are reflected in layoffs 
and other cuts,  but others are harder to capture. These  gains might be 
all the greater if the target is not well run to begin with and is acquired 
by a firm with better managers who find more ways to reduce costs. 
With the exception  of  labor cost  savings  (discussed  later),  the evi- 
dence on efficiency  improvements after hostile takeovers is still indirect. 
Morck, Shleifer,  and Vishny  find that targets of hostile takeovers have 
low Tobin's  q's relative to their industry peers and also that industries 
with significant hostile  activity have low  q's.7  Henri Servaes finds that 
bidding firms in tender offers have higher q's than do the targets.8 This 
evidence  points to better performers taking over poor performers. Ser- 
vaes  also finds that premiums are higher when the target's q is lower, 
suggesting  that there are greater efficiencies  to realize.  Unfortunately, 
it can also mean that targets are undervalued or that bidding firms are 
overvalued  and so have a low  cost of capital. 
5.  Stigler (1950). 
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We do not have the data to identify the sources of gains in strategic 
acquisitions,  other than layoffs.  Accordingly,  we  simply  identify  ac- 
quisitions  that appear to have an important strategic element,  and try 
to determine  how  prevalent  they  are in the hostile  takeover  process. 
We present some examples in which operating efficiencies  were realized 
as well as some examples with the potential for increased market power. 
The question of the sources of gains in general remains open,  and it is 
not clear to us that any simple description of synergistic gains in related 
acquisitions  will fit the data. We base this conclusion on an examination 
of all the accounts (qualitative and quantitative) of our sample takeovers 
that we could  find. The takeovers  are summarized in the appendix. 
Labor  Cost  Savings 
Labor costs  are by far the largest component  of costs  in most cor- 
porations. Labor cost savings can therefore be one of the most effective 
ways to increase cash flow.  Such savings  can take a number of forms, 
including  layoffs,  early retirements,  hiring freezes,  wage  reductions, 
reductions  in future pension  benefits,  and other cuts in compensation. 
If some of the employees  in the firm are paid more than their marginal 
product, then laying them off or cutting their pay can increase the cash 
flow  and so justify  some  of the premium. 
Previous  studies  have  examined  the  extent  of  labor cost  savings. 
Joshua Rosett considers  wage reductions of union employees  and finds 
that they  can  explain,  at most,  9 percent of  the takeover  premium.9 
Interestingly,  up to 21 percent of the premium can be explained for the 
subsample  in which the chief  executive  officer changes  after the take- 
over.  However,  the wage  changes  are not reliably different from zero 
in most specifications.  Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers present 
evidence of substantial wage reductions in one hostile takeover-Icahn's 
acquisition  of  TWA-that  are large  enough  to more than justify  the 
takeover premium. 10  They  have only  one famous case,  however. 
Wages,  of  course,  are not the only  form of  compensation.  Jeffrey 
Pontiff,  Andrei  Shleifer,  and Michael  Weisbach  present evidence  of 
reversions  of  excess  pension  assets  following  hostile  takeovers,  and 
9.  Rosett (1989). 
10.  Shleifer and Summers (1988). Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  7 
document  the  greater incidence  of  such  reversions  following  hostile 
takeovers  than following  friendly  acquisitions. I  They  estimate  that 
reversions  can  explain  about  13 percent of  the takeover  premium in 
cases  where they actually  occur,  but they occur in only  10 percent of 
cases.  Pontiff,  Shleifer,  and Weisbach  argue that pension  asset rever- 
sions represent a cut in future benefits to the employees.  Although these 
reversions  are a potentially  important source of takeover gains in a few 
cases,  on average they are relatively  unimportant. 
Overall,  the  available  evidence  on  compensation  cuts  of  existing 
workers  does  not  suggest  that such  cuts  are an important source  of 
takeover gains  in many cases. 
A second way to save on labor costs is to reduce employment.  Charles 
Brown and James Medoff  examine  control changes  in small Michigan 
companies  and find no evidence  of employment  reductions. 12 They do 
not appear to have a single hostile takeover in their sample. In an early 
version of his paper, Steve Kaplan finds some evidence  of employment 
reductions after defensive  MBOs that follow  hostile bids. 13 There is no 
evidence  of employment  reductions following  friendly MBOs.  Kaplan 
does  not estimate  the value  of  savings  from these  reductions.  Frank 
Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel  find evidence of substantial employment 
reductions  surrounding (and mostly  preceding)  ownership  changes- 
and not  necessarily  hostile  takeovers.14  They  also  find that such re- 
ductions are primarily among white-collar employees.  All these findings 
point to the potential  importance of employment  reductions,  although 
the studies do not estimate how much money is saved and do not draw 
an adequate distinction  between  hostile  and friendly takeovers. 
In discussing  layoffs,  it is important to keep in mind the normative 
interpretation of employment  reductions.  One view,  taken by Lichten- 
berg and Siegel,  is  that employment  reductions  of  headquarters per- 
sonnel in particular represent a pure efficiency  gain.15 Michael Jensen 
also argues that employment  reductions improve efficiency.'16  Shleifer 
11.  Pontiff,  Shleifer,  and Weisbach (1989). 
12.  Brown and Medoff (1988). 
13.  Kaplan (1990). 
14.  Lichtenberg and Siegel  (1988). 
15.  Lichtenberg and Siegel  (1988). 
16.  Jensen (1988). 8  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1990 
and Summers,  in contrast,  stress the importance of long-term implicit 
contracts in employment  relationships. 17 They do not deny that ex post 
layoffs  might  be  efficient;  rather, they  suggest  that if continued  em- 
ployment  is part of the implicit  contract, layoffs  represent a breach of 
trust that transfers future wages  in  excess  of  marginal product from 
employees  to shareholders. Moreover,  the efficiency  gain from moving 
workers across firms may be much smaller than their lost wages. 
We  cannot  determine  what  happens  to  laid-off  workers  after the 
takeover  and how  much their compensation  falls.  The  transfer com- 
ponent should be measured by the present value  of the difference  be- 
tween  current wages  and alternative wages.  In this paper we  attempt 
to measure the wage savings from takeovers and to compare them with 
the  takeover  premium.  We  cannot  determine  what fraction  of  these 
savings  is an efficiency  gain and what fraction is a transfer. The con- 
clusion  that everything  is  an efficiency  gain  is  premature, given  the 
universal  employee  insistence  that takeovers reduce their welfare. 
Divestitures 
Most hostile takeovers are followed  by significant divestitures: sales 
of  divisions  of  the target companies  to other firms,  investment  com- 
panies, or management teams in MBOs. Unlike layoffs,  debt increases, 
or investment cuts, divestitures do not necessarily  imply operational or 
financial changes,  although such changes may be made by the acquirers 
of divisions  following  the divestitures.  We do not identify these changes 
since we cannot follow  what happens to the acquired businesses.  How- 
ever,  it is useful  to describe the extent of divestitures  and to note how 
they should be interpreted. 
Bidding  firms might sell  off  divisions  of the target firms simply  to 
pay  off  some  of  the  debt  incurred in the  acquisition.  Such  a move, 
however,  does  not explain  how divestitures  fit into the bidders'  plans 
to justify  the premium.  For if the target was valued  fairly before  the 
takeover,  and if the buyers of divisions  pay fair prices for them and do 
not make any changes  in the operations,  then divestitures  do nothing 
to explain  the takeover  premium.  This  section  suggests  several  ways 
in which  divestitures  help pay the premium. 
17.  Shleifer and Summers (1988). Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  9 
First, the target might have been underpriced in the stock market to 
begin  with,  and so  if  a bustup occurs  at fair market prices,  takeover 
organizers can profit by unbundling undervalued divisions.  This theory 
of divestitures based on undervaluation of conglomerates has been tested 
by  Dean  LeBaron  and Lawrence  Speidell.18  They  compute  breakup 
values  of  conglomerates  by  applying  price-earnings  multiples  of  un- 
diversified  firms in the same industry as each division  of the conglom- 
erate to the earnings of that division  and adding up the divisions.  They 
find that this breakup value  of  conglomerates  is typically  higher than 
the  market price.  They  do  not  take  into  account  the possibility  that 
divisions  of  conglomerates  might be getting  lower  multiples  because 
they grow less fast or invest in projects with negative net present value. 
Nonetheless,  their analysis  is suggestive. 
Second,  if the diversified company sold for a fair market value under 
its old  management,  it must be that the pieces  are worth more to the 
buyers than they are to the takeover artist or under the old management. 
One  such  group of  buyers,  incentive-intensive  organizations  such as 
management buyout teams or investment  companies,  can improve the 
cash flow by reducing  tax payments,  cutting  investment  and employ- 
ment, and taking other steps to reduce costs.  In these cases,  the higher 
cash flow comes  from more effective  management and not from com- 
bining two related firms. To be sure, we still cannot conclude  in these 
cases that the primary source of value gains is efficiency  improvements 
rather than wealth transfers. 
A second type of buyer to whom divisions  of a target firm could be 
especially  valuable is a strategic buyer with his own operating company 
who can either exploit  the combination  of  the two firms or is  simply 
willing  to overpay  for the division.  Such strategic buyers are in fact 
much more common  than divisional  MBOs,  and selloffs  to them are 
probably the main reason that bustups are profitable. Just as with initial 
acquisitions  by strategic buyers,  it is not known whether these selloffs 
to strategic buyers improve efficiency  or just redistribute wealth away 
from consumers,  suppliers,  or other firms in the industry. 
Tax Savings 
Reductions  in taxes can come from a variety of sources,  the first and 
most obvious of which is the savings from merging a profitable company 
18.  LeBaron and Speidell (1987). 10  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
with one that has tax losses.  The combination can realize the tax benefits 
sooner  than the  owner  of  tax  losses  can  alone,  and therefore  these 
benefits are more valuable to the combined entity.  Alan Auerbach and 
David  Reishus  have  shown,  and we confirm with our data, that these 
tax benefits  are important in some  5 percent of the cases. 19 
The  second  source  of  tax savings  before  the  1986  tax reform was 
the general  utilities  doctrine  combined  with accelerated  depreciation, 
which enabled the acquirer to redepreciate the target's  assets  in some 
cases  without the selling  company's  having to pay capital gains taxes 
on the assets  sold.  Unfortunately,  no available studies gauge the mag- 
nitude of this source of tax savings. 
The third source  of  tax savings  has been conversion  of  the target, 
or some  part of  it,  into  a partnership, such  as a master limited  part- 
nership.  As  a result,  double taxation of profits-at  both the corporate 
and the  individual  level-could  be  avoided.  This  loophole  is  largely 
closed  now,  but was available  during our sample period. 
Perhaps the most important potential source of tax gains in takeovers 
is increases  in leverage  and deductibility  of interest payments on debt. 
These  gains can be achieved  if the target was underleveraged to begin 
with,  so  that increases  in leverage  create corporate-level  tax benefits 
not offset  by significantly  higher expected  costs of financial distress or 
personal taxes paid by bondholders.  In the case of leveraged buyouts, 
Steven Kaplan shows that tax savings from leverage explain at least 50 
percent and perhaps more than  100 percent of  the takeover premium 
on average.20  This  number makes  all the other sources of  gains  pale 
by comparison.  To estimate the value of the tax shield,  we would need 
information on how fast the debt is repaid. Our rough estimates suggest 
that the potential for increasing value through higher leverage in hostile 
takeovers  is  indeed  substantial  but still  much  smaller  than Kaplan's 
estimate  for the MBOs. 
Investment  Cuts 
Jensen  argues that takeovers  stop target firms from investing  their 
surplus cash in negative net present value projects.2"  The takeover gains 
19.  Auerbach and Reishus (1988). 
20.  Kaplan (1989). 
21.  Jensen (1986). Sanjai Bhagat,  Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  11 
are realized  because  the money  previously  wasted  is now  distributed 
as interest or dividends.  Jensen cites  oil  exploration  expenses  and di- 
versification  by conglomerates  as examples  of  wasteful  expenditures. 
Part of  the  gain  in  a takeover,  then,  is  a commitment  to  stop  such 
investments. 
Inferring waste from post-takeover  investment cuts is not as simple 
as it looks.  First,  cuts in investment  can simply  be a response  to low 
availability of internal funds rather than a source of value. Kaplan finds 
evidence  of significant  investment  cuts in management buyouts,  but it 
is  not clear  whether  these  cuts  eliminate  waste  or productive  invest- 
ment.22 Second,  the divestitures  and fast debt repayment that typically 
follow  hostile  takeovers  relax the cash constraint and therefore might 
actually make further wasteful investment easier even in Jensen's model. 
His model does  not explain  why firms try to get back so quickly to the 
level of cash flow at which they can invest.  Despite  these reservations, 
Jensen's  free cash flow theory is a tenable explanation of hostile  take- 
overs  in several  industries,  and we  try to evaluate  its empirical  rele- 
vance. 
Summary 
These potential sources of target shareholders' wealth gains in take- 
overs-bidding  shareholders'  losses,  gains  from  strategic  combina- 
tions, layoffs, divestitures, tax savings, and investment cuts-are  germane 
to a variety  of  takeover  theories.  Unfortunately,  one  can rarely infer 
from the evidence  about these  operational  changes  whether takeover 
gains are dominated by efficiency  improvements or by wealth transfers. 
Strategic  takeovers  probably  increase  operating efficiency  but might 
hurt consumers,  suppliers, or industry rivals as well.  Layoffs both raise 
efficiency  and transfer wealth  from workers earning substantial rents 
at their jobs.  Divestitures  raise  efficiency  if  firms are sold  to  better 
management teams,  but they also reflect transfers as underpriced com- 
panies  are busted  up or as divisions  are sold  to  overpaying  growth- 
oriented managers. In the latter case,  efficiency  might fall. Tax savings 
are largely transfers from the government; they are not efficiency  gains. 
Finally,  investment  cuts  can  eliminate  wasteful  overinvestment,  but 
22.  Kaplan (1990). 12  Brookings Papers.  Microeconomics 1990 
they can also transfer wealth from the investment sector (for example, 
oil  field services).  Moreover,  investment  cuts necessitated  by high le- 
verage might actually decrease total wealth.  The result is that many of 
the changes  following  hostile  takeovers  cannot be unambiguously  in- 
terpreted as wealth  transfers or efficiency  improvements-they  prob- 
ably have elements  of both. Nonetheless,  the question remains of how 
important some  of these  changes  are empirically. 
Description of the Data 
As noted,  the sample in this paper consists  of all 62 firms that were 
targets of hostile  takeover offers of more than $50 million,  as reported 
by W.  T.  Grimm for the period  1984-86.23  Like most others,  W.  T. 
Grimm classifies  hostile  takeovers as those in which the target's board 
at least  initially  expressed  opposition,  if only  to raise the price.  The 
sample  stops  in  1986  to  allow  a look  at changes  in the two  to three 
years following  the takeover.  The  sample  includes  successful  hostile 
takeovers,  hostile takeover attempts in which the actual acquisition was 
completed  by a "white  knight"  (including  defensive  MBOs),  and un- 
successful  hostile  takeover bids in which the target remained indepen- 
dent. Whenever possible,  we point out systematic  differences  between 
outcomes  for targets that are successfully  acquired by hostile  bidders 
and outcomes  for those  that are ultimately  acquired by white knights 
or remain independent. A substantial coercive element is probably pres- 
ent in almost  all of these  deals. 
Table  1 presents  the distribution of  our sample of hostile  takeover 
attempts, by outcome,  during the three years of our sample. The number 
of  attempts  nearly  tripled.  The  ratio  of  takeovers  by  white  knights 
relative  to  straight hostile  takeovers  also  rises  substantially,  perhaps 
because of the increased availability of investment resources on the part 
of  large firms that usually  act as white knights over the course of the 
economic  expansion. 
23.  We used the $50 million cutoff because  too little information  was available  for 
smaller  deals. This restriction  eliminates  few observations,  since being  a target  of a hostile 
bid is typically  a privilege  of only very large  firms  with diffuse  ownership  structures. Sanjai  Bhagat, Andrei  Shleifer,  and Robert  Vishny  13 
Table 1. Distribution  of Sample of Hostile Takeover Attempts in the United States, 
1984-86 
Outcome  1984  1985  1986 
Successful  takeover  7  12  10 
White knight acquisition  1  8  12 
Unsuccessful  bid  2  4  6 
Total  10  24  28 
Source: Andrei F. Rhoads, ed., Mergetstat Review 1986 (Chicago: W. T. Grimm, 1986); and authors'  calculations. 
The most  important constraint on the analysis  of post-takeover  ex- 
perience  is  that the  bidder  and the  target are merged.  That  is  why 
Ravenscraft and Scherer's line-of-business  sample is in many ways more 
informative than our own,  although it comes from an earlier period and 
hence has few hostile  takeovers.24 For the same reason, Kaplan can get 
much better information in some respects by focusing  on MBOs.25 Our 
research is limited by our inability to separate the target and the bidder, 
and our reluctance  to use the joint  data. 
Throughout the analysis,  we  rely  on multiple  sources  of  data,  in- 
cluding the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) stock price 
data; bidder and target annual reports; 10 K forms; Moody's Industrial 
Manual;  Value  Line  Investment  Survey; the Wall Street Journal;  the 
New  York Times; business  periodicals,  especially  Business  Week and 
trade publications;  and DATEXT.  We try to piece  together the infor- 
mation from all these sources because  post-takeover  information typi- 
cally  concerns  the merged  firm, making the attribution of changes  to 
the target difficult.  Most important, for our analysis of layoffs,  selloffs, 
investment cuts,  and tax savings  we use only quantitative information. 
Our numbers should not be confused with journalistic opinions.  Because 
reporting can be incomplete,  however,  most of our measures of changes 
are probably biased downward.  We measure only what is reported. In 
interpreting our results,  it is crucial  to keep  in mind these  data limi- 
tations. 
24.  Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987). 
25.  Kaplan (1990). 14  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1990 
Wealth Changes of the Shareholders 
The first step in documenting  the wealth changes of shareholders is 
to calculate  the gain,  or the premium,  paid to the target firm's share- 
holders.26 We compute the premium as follows.  First, we take the (often 
long) period from 20 days before the first bid for the target is announced, 
to the day when the target accepts or defeats the final bid.  We call the 
first date Datel  and the  second  Date2.  We  then estimate  the market 
model  for each  target firm from 260  trading days before  Datel  to 60 
trading days before Datel.  Using  that market model,  we forecast what 
the price of  each  target would  be on Date2  given  its actual value  on 
Datel  and the  return on  the  market between  Datel  and Date2.  The 
premium is the difference  between the price paid (or offered in the last 
bid in the case of unsuccessful  takeovers) for the target and the predicted 
price on Date2.  In other words,  the premium is the difference  between 
what was  paid  (offered)  and what the price  would  have  been  on  the 
resolution  date  had  no  takeover  activity  occurred.  We  use  the  long 
interval  to  take  account  of  market movements  during the  period  of 
negotiation.  At the same time,  we do not use any market prices,  other 
than the  price  of  20  days  before  the  very  first bid,  to  compute  the 
premium because  market prices reflect a variety of market beliefs  and 
hence  do  not reflect  the premium alone.  Using  such prices  generally 
leads to lower estimates  of the premium than our procedure. 
Computing changes  in the wealth of the bidding firm's shareholders 
is more complicated  because  there is no equivalent  of the price paid. 
Also,  using  a long  interval  in this case  creates  significant  problems, 
because  many large acquirers have dramatic value  changes  over long 
intervals  that might have  nothing to do with the acquisition.  Accord- 
ingly,  to evaluate the change in the wealth of the bidding shareholders, 
we define Date3 as the date of the first bid by the actual acquirer. Date3 
always  falls between  Datel  and Date2,  and it often coincides  with one 
26.  By  focusing  on shareholders, we  ignore other financial claimants such as bond- 
holders. There is no systematic analysis of the returns to bondholders in hostile takeovers. 
The analyses of takeovers as a whole show that bondholders unprotected by covenants lose 
small  amounts of  wealth,  whereas protected bondholders do not lose-see  Asquith and 
Wizman  (1989).  The  magnitude of  bondholder wealth  losses  is  quite small  relative to 
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of them. We then estimate the market model for the bidding firm from 
260 days before to 60 days before Date3 and use this model to compute 
the abnormal change in bidding shareholders' wealth from 3 days before 
to 3 days after Date3.  We define the return to bidding shareholders as 
this abnormal wealth change. 
We  do  not estimate  bidding  shareholders'  returns in unsuccessful 
bids because  we have found no satisfactory  procedures.  Accordingly, 
in these  cases  we  ignore  the bidding  shareholders and try to explain 
the  premium  offered  to  the  target shareholders  in  terms of  changes 
implemented  after the bid. 
The  results  for  the  takeover  premium and for  the  increase  in  the 
wealth of the bidding shareholders are presented in table 2. Throughout 
this paper, we deal with dollar rather than percentage wealth changes 
since  it is dollar values  that we  try to explain.  The premiums in this 
sample  vary significantly,  and some of them are very small when ad- 
justed  for  market movements.  These  are typically  the  cases  of  bids 
highly  contested  by the target's  management where the bidder gained 
control  in part by buying  shares in the open  market. In general,  the 
premiums are somewhat  smaller than those one would obtain without 
the market correction because  the market rose during this period. 
The  results  on bidders  are often  missing.  We  do  not compute  the 
returns to bidders in unsuccessful  takeovers.  Furthermore, many of the 
bidders  are not  listed  on  CRSP  because  they  are foreign  companies 
(Hanson  Trust,  Campeau,  First City Financial)  or private companies 
often  owned  by the raiders (Reliance  Capital,  Maxxam,  James Gold- 
smith,  Asher Edelman,  and so forth) or leveraged  buyout specialists. 
As  a result of  these  omissions,  we  report changes  in bidding  share- 
holders'  wealth in only  30 cases. 
The results are similar to the usual findings for bidders,  except  we 
find that bidder returns are negative  in more than half  the cases.  On 
average,  the bidders lose  $15  million,  a tiny  fraction of  the average 
acquisition  price of  $1.74  billion  (including  debt)'. Unavailability  of 
data might  bias  these  results  toward  finding  poorer performance  by 
bidders,  since  raiders typically  bid through private firms and their re- 
turns are more likely  to be positive.  Note,  however,  that Irwin Jacobs, 
in  two  acquisitions  by  Minstar,  earned  a  negative  market-corrected 
return in both cases. 
Bidder returns are very negative  in some related acquisitions,  such Table 
2. 
Changes 
in 
the 
Wealth 
of 
Target 
and 
Bidding 
Shareholders, 
Sample 
of 
Hostile 
Takeover 
Attempts, 
1984-86 
Millions 
of 
dollars 
Change 
in 
Target 
Bidder 
Takeover 
premium 
bidder 
wealth 
Total 
1. 
Aegis 
Minstar 
22 
- 
1 
21 
2. 
American 
Motor 
Inn 
Prime 
Motor 
Inn 
60 
19 
79 
3. 
Allied 
Stores 
Campeau 
1,106 
n.a 
n.a. 
4. 
American 
Natural 
Resources 
Coastal 
763 
117 
880 
5. 
AMF 
Minstar 
74 
-25 
49 
6. 
Anderson 
Clayton 
Quaker 
Oatsa 
108 
- 
165 
-57 
7. 
Atlas 
Van 
Linesb 
Wesraya 
27 
n.a. 
n.a. 
8. 
Avondale 
Mills 
Walton 
Monroe 
Millsa 
38 
n.a. 
n.a. 
9. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedc 
397 
. 
. 
. 
10. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedc 
1,162 
... 
... 
11. 
CBS 
Turner 
Broadcastingc 
2,754 
. 
. 
. 
... 
12. 
Chesebrough-Ponds 
Unilevera 
1,440 
43 
1,483 
13. 
Cluett 
Peabody 
Westpoint 
Pepperella 
77 
- 
14 
63 
14. 
Crown 
Zellerbach 
James 
Goldsmith 
193 
n.a. 
n.a. 
15. 
Easco 
Equity 
Group 
27 
n.a. 
n.a. 
16. 
Frigitronics 
Revlon 
41 
-27 
14 
17. 
Frontier 
Holdings 
People 
Expressa 
117 
13 
130 
18. 
Fruehaufb 
Fruehauf 
Holdinga 
414 
n.a. 
n.a. 
19. 
Gillette 
Revlonc 
1,483 
. 
. 
. 
... 
20. 
Great 
Lakes 
International 
Itel 
14 
9 
23 21. 
Gulton 
Mark 
IV 
Industries 
36 
-6 
30 
22. 
Hammermill 
Paper 
International 
Papera 
418 
11 
429 
23. 
Hook 
Drugs 
Krogera 
74 
-26 
48 
24. 
Houston 
Natural 
Gas 
Coastalc 
961 
... 
25. 
Imperial 
Continental 
Gas 
Gulf 
Resourcesc 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
26. 
Informatics 
General 
Sterling 
Software 
28 
-4 
24 
27. 
John 
Blair 
Reliance 
Capitala 
165 
n.a. 
n.a. 
28. 
Jonathan 
Logan 
UMM 
16 
6 
22 
29. 
Joy 
Technologiesb 
Joy 
Manufacturinga 
229 
n. 
a. 
n. 
a. 
30. 
Masland 
Burlington 
Industries 
42 
-79 
-37 
31. 
Mayflower 
Laidlawc 
63 
n.a. 
n.a. 
32. 
McGraw-Edison 
Cooper 
Industries 
410 
-41 
369 
33. 
Medford 
Amalgamated 
Sugar 
49 
n.a. 
n.a. 
34. 
MidCon 
Occidental 
Petroleuma 
1,406 
-365 
1,041 
35. 
National 
Gypsumb 
Management 
Groupa 
325 
n.a. 
n.a. 
36. 
NL 
Industries 
Harold 
Simmons 
-77 
n.a. 
n.a. 
37. 
Owens 
Coming 
Fiberglass 
Wickesc 
528 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
38. 
Pacific 
Lumber 
Maxxam 
256 
1 
257 
39. 
Phillips 
Petroleum 
Carl 
Icahnc 
1,219 
. 
. 
. 
... 
40. 
Ponderosa 
Edelman 
68 
n.a. 
n.a. 
41. 
Prentice 
Hall 
Gulf 
and 
Western 
254 
-59 
195 
42. 
Quotron 
Citicorp 
137 
109 
246 
43. 
Revlon 
Inc. 
Pantry 
Pride 
256 
n.a. 
n.a. 
44. 
Richardson-Vicks 
Procter 
and 
Gamblea 
776 
- 
165 
611 
45. 
Ryan 
Homes 
HV 
Homes 
64 
n.a. 
n.a. Table 
2. 
(continued) 
Change 
in 
Target 
Bidder 
Takeover 
premium 
bidder 
wealth 
Total 
46. 
Safewayb 
KKRa 
1,512 
n.a. 
n.a. 
47. 
Saga 
Marriott 
148 
- 
162 
- 
14 
48. 
Sanders 
Associates 
Lockheeda 
614 
119 
732 
49. 
SCM 
Hanson 
Trust 
386 
n.a. 
n.a. 
50. 
Scovill 
First 
City 
Properties 
212 
n.a. 
n.a. 
51. 
Southland 
Royalty 
Burlington 
Northern 
126 
-97 
29 
52. 
Sperry 
Burroughs 
1,223 
n.a. 
n.a. 
53. 
Strawbridge 
& 
Clothier 
Berryc 
55 
n.a. 
n.a. 
54. 
Tull 
Industries 
Bethlehem 
Steela 
26 
52 
78 
55. 
Unidynamics 
Cranea 
99 
- 
15 
84 
56. 
Union 
Carbide 
GAFC 
1,344 
. 
.. 
... 
57. 
Uniroyalb 
Clayton-Dubiliera 
234 
n.a. 
n.a. 
58. 
Unocal 
Mesa 
Partnersc 
2,206 
. 
. 
. 
... 
59. 
U.S. 
Industries 
Hanson 
Trust 
196 
n.a. 
n.a. 
60. 
Van 
Dusen 
Air 
APL 
Partnership 
14 
1 
15 
61. 
Westchester 
Financial 
Service 
Marine 
Midland 
Banka 
35 
8 
43 
62. 
White 
Consolidated 
Electrolux 
164 
n. 
a. 
n.a. 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. 
a. 
White 
Knight. 
b. 
LBO. 
c. 
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as  Occidental's  buying  Midcon  and Marriott's  buying  Saga.  On the 
other hand, other strategic acquisitions,  such as Citicorp's buying Quo- 
tron and Coastal's  buying  American  Natural Resources,  result in in- 
creases in the wealth of bidding shareholders. We cannot conclude from 
this sample that related acquisitions  are systematically  good or bad for 
the  bidders,  although  earlier  work  by  Morck,  Shleifer,  and Vishny 
suggests that in this period related acquisitions are better for the bidders 
than unrelated ones.27 
The last column  of table 2 presents the combined  wealth change of 
the bidder and the target for the available observations.  The change is 
positive  in all but three cases,  each of which is a strategic acquisition 
by a firm extending  its product line.  In general,  most of the gains  go 
to the target,  and the bidder wealth change is relatively  small, just as 
the other studies  find. It is not  the case in this sample that target gains 
can often  be explained  as bidder losses. 
Layoffs and the Takeover Premium 
One of the most direct ways for the acquirer to justify  the takeover 
premium is to lay off  employees  and save on labor costs.  The oppor- 
tunities for layoffs are considerable: consolidation of headquarters,  white- 
collar employment cuts due to selloffs,  closing  of plants, consolidation 
of production, and many others. Because labor costs are so high relative 
to profits,  the effect  of  such savings  on the market value can be sub- 
stantial. 
Our measure of  layoffs  is the sum of  layoffs  and early retirements 
from the retained divisions  that can be attributed to the target company, 
as reported by  any of  our sources.  We  use  documented  evidence  of 
early retirements in only  two cases  (Gillette  and Owens  Corning); the 
vast majority of observations are layoffs. All types of layoffs are grouped 
together-those  from plant closings,  staff reductions,  consolidations, 
and so forth. However,  in most cases we can distinguish between white- 
and blue-collar layoffs.  Most of the information on layoffs comes from 
the Wall Street  Journal,  although other sources are sometimes used. In 
two cases,  where we saw reports of layoffs but did not have the numbers, 
27.  Morck, Shleifer,  and Vishny (1990). 20  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
we  called  the bidding  company  and got  the numbers from them.  We 
include all post-takeover  layoffs  for three calendar years,  starting with 
the year of the takeover. 
For  several  reasons  our  post-takeover  layoff  numbers  are biased 
downward.  First, we do not include the layoffs  from the bidding firm, 
although one could argue that these layoffs  helped to pay the premium 
and hence  can be included  in the calculation  of cost  savings.  Second, 
we  look  at actual  layoffs  and not  at employment  reductions  due  to 
selloffs.  Nor do we follow  sold-off  divisions  to check what happened 
to employment  there.  If the cuts occurred after the selloffs,  we  miss 
them. For these reasons,  we do not use Compustat data on employment 
changes  because  bidder  layoffs  and especially  selloffs  are often  the 
causes  of  reduced  Compustat  employment.  Third,  if  no  publication 
reported a layoff,  we assume that none has occurred. Wherever we have 
data on both employment and layoffs,  our layoff number is much smaller 
than the decline in measured employment,  which reflects selloffs.  Hav- 
ing mentioned  these  sources of downward bias in the layoff  numbers, 
we should also mention that in some cases our numbers probably over- 
estimate the number of layoffs precipitated  by the takeover because the 
layoffs  would  have occurred anyway.  More on this later. 
To compute the value of labor cost savings,  we assume that the after- 
tax cost of a blue-collar  worker is $20,000  a year, that of a white-collar 
worker $50,000  a year.  Labor costs  of course include all benefits (in- 
cluding  social  security),  which  run at 30  percent or more of  wages. 
These numbers imply an annual pretax labor cost of $30,000  to $40,000 
for blue-collar workers and $70,000  to $ 100,000  for white-collar work- 
ers,  depending  on whether the tax rate is 34 percent or 46 percent. 
The U. S. Department of Labor's publication, Employment and Earn- 
ings (January 1987),  reports December  1986 weekly  earnings for pro- 
duction workers in durable  goods manufacturing  of $443, or approximately 
$23,000  on  an annual basis.  A  study by Felicia  Nathan published  in 
the Monthly Labor Review  (October  1987)  reports that wages  are ap- 
proximately  70  percent of  total compensation  in U.S.  manufacturing. 
Using  these figures,  we get an average blue-collar  pretax employment 
cost  in durable manufacturing in  1986 of  $32,600.  It is a little  more 
difficult  to get a handle on the employment  cost for the average man- 
agerial worker laid off.  Nathan's study reports that total compensation 
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proximately  1.8  times  that for a typical  blue-collar  worker. We have 
assumed an employment  cost for managerial workers 2.5  times that for 
blue-collar workers, adjusting Nathan's figure upward because the man- 
agerial layoffs in our sample are concentrated at corporate headquarters. 
In the few  cases  where we  have both the number of  laid-off  workers 
and the annual cost  saving  reported by the firm, plugging  in our esti- 
mates of labor savings gave us answers very close to the savings reported 
by the firms. 
Of course,  labor cost savings  should be interpreted as the difference 
between  the cost  of  hiring these  workers and their marginal product. 
The laid-off  workers might be producing only  slightly  less  than they 
are paid,  in which  case  the annual savings  are much smaller.  Unfor- 
tunately,  we have no estimates  of the marginal product and so cannot 
estimate the true savings.  It is easier to believe that the marginal product 
of laid-off  workers is lower for white-collar  than for blue-collar  work- 
ers, since white-collar  functions of the target can be more easily carried 
out by the bidding firm without extra costs.  We propose our calculation 
as a useful  benchmark that should  be  adjusted on the basis  of  one's 
views  about output loss. 
The second  question  is how  to compute  the present value  of  labor 
cost  savings.  We  assume  that the real risk-adjusted discount  rate ap- 
plicable  to this calculation  is 10 percent, consistent  with a real riskless 
rate of 4 percent and a risk premium of 6 percent. We use the real rate 
because in principle wages rise with inflation. We make the calculation 
assuming  that the  labor cost  saving  will  last  five  years,  after which 
perhaps the people would have been laid off or retired without replace- 
ment  even  without  a control  change.  We  also  make  the  calculation 
assuming that the labor cost saving is permanent. To simplify the com- 
putations, we calculate the savings from layoffs  on the assumption that 
all the layoffs  are done right after the takeover.  For both calculations 
of the present value,  we also compute the ratio of the present value of 
labor cost  savings  to the takeover  premium.  The computation  of  the 
premium is described  in the previous  section.  This gives  us estimates 
of the fraction of the takeover premium that can be explained by labor 
cost  savings. 
The riskiness of savings  created by layoffs  is hard to determine. We 
would argue that the savings  are risky in the sense that they might have 
been realized anyway if the firm did poorly but not if the firm did well. 22  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
On the other hand,  if the savings  are closer  to risk-free,  perhaps a 5 
percent discount rate might be appropriate. Use of a 5 percent discount 
rate would  increase the five-year  saving by only  about 14 percent but 
would double  the savings  calculated  as a perpetuity. 
Table 3 presents the information on the 28 of our 62 firms for which 
there  is  direct  evidence  of  layoffs.  Recall  that the  sample  includes 
successful  hostile  takeovers,  white knight acquisitions,  and unsuccess- 
ful takeovers.  For the remaining firms, there is no evidence  of layoffs. 
This is not necessarily  to say that no layoffs  occurred,  but rather that 
the sources we have do not mention layoffs.  For 7 of our 28 firms, the 
sources  mentioned  that layoffs  had occurred but did not  specify  the 
numbers.  Imperial  Continental  Gas  was  excluded  from this  analysis 
because it is foreign,  and very little information on it is available.  The 
averages  are thus computed  using  21  firms with layoffs  and 33  firms 
for which no layoffs  are mentioned and hence are assumed to be zero. 
For the 21 targets that experienced layoffs,  the number laid off ranges 
between  120 and 6,148,  or between  0.1  percent and 24.3  percent of 
the labor force of the target firm. The average layoff  among the firms 
is  1,262  employees,  or 5.7  percent of  the firms'  work force.  These 
numbers, of course,  are cut by about 61 percent to take account of the 
fact that 33  of  the 62  firms experienced  no layoffs.  Even  so,  layoffs 
are not trivial for affected  firms: a takeover-successful  or not-costs 
on average 500 jobs,  assuming  that these people would not have been 
laid off  had the takeover not occurred.  At the same time,  the total job 
loss  in the economy  because  of companies  directly affected by hostile 
takeovers  is trivial.  In our whole  sample over three years,  fewer than 
30,000  workers were laid off. 
Some  evidence  on the question  of how much of the premium these 
layoffs  can justify  is also presented in table 3. Under our assumptions 
about wages  of white-collar  and blue-collar  workers, the annual after- 
tax labor cost  savings  range from $6.0  million  to $200  million,  with 
an average of $37.5  million.  If these savings last five years, they explain 
an  average  of  27. 1 percent  of  the  premium  in  cases  where  layoffs 
actually  occur,  with the range between  2.1  percent and 89.9  percent. 
In 9  out of  the 21  cases  these  savings  explain  over  a quarter of  the 
premium. If these savings  are permanent, they can justify 65.5  percent 
of the premium on average and more than a quarter of the premium in 
15 out of 21 cases.  Moreover,  in 6 cases  the savings  can justify  more Table 
3. 
Employee 
Layoffs 
Subsequent 
to 
Takeover 
Bid, 
Sample 
Hostile 
Takeover 
Target 
Firms, 
1984-86 
Estimated 
savings 
from 
layoffs* 
Millions 
of 
dollars 
Layoffs 
Present 
value 
at 
Present 
value 
as 
percent 
Percent 
of 
10 
percent 
of 
premium 
Firm 
Number 
work 
force 
Annually 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
1. 
Allied 
Stores 
2,625a 
4.3 
70.5 
267.9 
705 
24.2 
63.7 
2. 
American 
Natural 
Resources 
400b 
3.6 
12.6 
47.9 
126 
6.3 
16.5 
3. 
AMF 
350c 
1.9 
17.5 
66.5 
175 
89.9 
236.5 
4. 
Anderson 
Clayton 
200d 
1.1 
10.0 
38.0 
100 
35.2 
92.6 
5. 
CBS 
1,492e 
5.0 
62.7 
238.3 
627 
8.7 
22.8 
6. 
Chesebrough-Ponds 
400f 
1.7 
8.0 
30.4 
80 
2.1 
5.6 
7. 
Crown 
Zellerbach 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n. 
a. 
8. 
Fruehauf 
730h 
2.8 
14.6 
55.5 
146 
13.4 
35.3 
9. 
Gillette 
2,400' 
8.0 
48.0 
182.4 
480 
12.3 
32.4 
10. 
Houston 
Natural 
Gas 
n.a.i 
na. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
11. 
Informatics 
General 
120k 
4.6 
6.0 
22.8 
60 
81.4 
214.3 
12. 
Mayflower 
Group 
125 
5.0 
6.3 
23.8 
63 
37.8 
100.0 
13. 
McGraw-Edison 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
14. 
MidCon 
2,000- 
23.9 
40.0 
152.0 
400 
10.8 
28.5 
15. 
NL 
Industries 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
16. 
Owens 
Coming 
Fiberglass 
8530 
3.0 
42.65 
162.1 
426.5 
30.7 
80.8 
17. 
Phillips 
Petroleum 
6,148P 
24.3 
123.0 
467.4 
1,230 
38.3 
100.9 
18. 
Ponderosa 
120 
0.5 
6.0 
22.8 
60 
33.5 
88.2 
19. 
Revlon 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
na. 
na. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
20. 
Safeway 
300r 
0.1 
15.0 
57.0 
150 
3.8 
9.9 Table 
3. 
(continued) 
Estimated 
savings 
from 
layoffs* 
Layoffs 
Millions 
of 
dollars 
Present 
value 
as 
percent 
Present 
value 
at 
of 
premium 
Percent 
of 
10 
percent 
Firm 
Number 
work 
force 
Annually 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
21. 
Sanders 
Associates 
165s 
2.1 
8.3 
31.4 
83 
5.1 
13.5 
22. 
Scovill 
n.a.t 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
23. 
Southland 
Royalty 
n.a.u 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
24. 
Sperry 
2,370v 
3.0 
47.4 
180.1 
474 
14.7 
38.8 
25. 
Union 
Carbide 
4,000w 
15.0 
200.0 
760.0 
2,000 
56.5 
148.8 
26. 
Uniroyal 
700X 
3.5 
29.0 
110.2 
290 
47.1 
124.0 
27. 
Unocal 
600Y 
3.0 
12.0 
45.6 
120 
2.1 
5.4 
28. 
U.S. 
Industries 
400Z 
3.1 
8.0 
30.4 
80 
15.5 
40.8 
Average 
1,261.8 
5.7 
37.5 
142.4 
375 
27.1 
71.3 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. 
n.a. 
Not 
available. 
a. 
Six 
hundred 
employees 
from 
Allied's 
headquarters; 
Campeau 
cut 
2,025 
of 
Allied's 
(blue-collar) 
workers. 
b. 
ANR 
had 
a 
takeover 
agreement 
with 
its 
acquirer. 
Coastal 
Corp.. 
to 
keep 
ANR's 
headquarters 
in 
Detroit 
and 
honor 
ANR's 
employment 
contracts. 
Four 
hundred 
jobs 
(including 
153 
management 
positions) 
were 
eliminated 
from 
Coastal's 
subsidiary, 
ANR 
Freight. 
in 
1987. 
To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs. 
we 
assumed 
that 
153 
white-collar 
and 
247 
blue-collar 
employees 
were 
laid 
off. 
c. 
Three 
hundred 
and 
fifty 
of 
AMF's 
400-member 
senior 
management 
and 
corporate 
staff 
were 
fired 
in 
August 
1985. 
d. 
Quaker 
Oats' 
PR 
Department 
notes 
that 
200 
employees 
from 
Anderson 
Clayton's 
headquarters 
were 
laid 
off. 
e. 
Seventy-four 
TV 
news 
staff 
(9/85), 
8 
economic 
analysis 
staff 
(9/85), 
40 
record 
group 
staff 
(11/85). 
700 
broadcast 
group 
employees 
(7/86). 
300 
from 
a 
New 
Jersey 
plant 
(7/86). 
30 
corporate 
staff 
(9/86), 
14 
publishing 
group 
staff 
(10/86), 
70 
secretarial 
pool 
and 
medical 
staff 
(10/86). 
26 
pages 
(10/86). 
230 
news 
staff 
(3/87). 
To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs, 
we 
assumed 
that 
30 
white-collar 
and 
1,462 
blue-collar 
employees 
were 
laid 
off. f. 
Plant 
closed-400 
workers 
affected 
(10/87). 
g. 
Closed 
two 
plants. 
discontinued 
other 
operations. 
and 
consolidated 
technical 
services: 
exact 
number 
of 
reduction 
in 
personnel 
not 
known. 
h. 
These 
730 
employees 
are 
presumed 
to 
be 
blue-collar 
workers. 
Also, 
reduction 
of 
administrative 
personnel 
and 
closure 
of 
two 
plants. 
i. 
Gillette's 
board 
approved 
a 
restructuring 
plan 
that 
would 
reduce 
Gillette's 
worldwide 
work 
force 
by 
2,400 
(8 
percent) 
through 
retirements, 
attrition, 
and 
firings. 
j. 
After 
the 
HNG/Internorth 
merger, 
work 
force 
was 
reduced 
by 
1,670 
(19 
percent). 
Unclear 
how 
many 
are 
ex-HNG 
employees. 
k. 
Acquirer 
(Sterling 
Software) 
cuts 
corporate 
staff. 
1. 
Seven 
McGraw-Edison 
plants 
closed. 
A 
McGraw-Edison 
unit's 
headquarters 
shut 
down. 
Exact 
numbers 
of 
employees 
are 
not 
known. 
m. 
We 
do 
not 
know 
if 
the 
2,000 
laid-off 
workers 
are 
blue-collar 
or 
white-collar 
employees. 
In 
computing 
the 
estimated 
annual 
savings 
from 
layoffs. 
we 
assumed 
that 
all 
these 
2.000 
employees 
are 
blue-collar 
workers. 
n. 
Number 
of 
NL 
employees 
in 
the 
United 
States 
decreased 
from 
3,200 
(12/80) 
to 
820 
(12/87). 
Although 
there 
are 
no 
selloffs. 
it 
is 
unclear 
how 
much 
of 
this 
decrease 
can 
be 
attributed 
to 
layoffs. 
o. 
OCF 
laid 
off 
480 
of 
its 
970 
research 
employees. 
Another 
373 
white-collar 
employees 
took 
early 
retirement. 
p. 
Layoffs: 
2,378 
(4/86). 
2,180 
(12/87), 
1,590 
(4/88). 
To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs, 
we 
assumed 
that 
these 
were 
all 
blue-collar 
employees. 
q. 
Layers 
of 
management 
and 
legal 
staff 
eliminated. 
Exact 
number 
not 
known. 
r. 
These 
are 
25 
percent 
of 
the 
headquarters 
staff 
(8/86). 
Also, 
union 
leaders 
at 
Safeway 
are 
concerned 
about 
the 
effect 
on 
their 
members 
of 
Safeway's 
spinoffs. 
s. 
To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs, 
we 
assumed 
that 
these 
are 
white-collar 
employees. 
t. 
Scovill 
cuts 
corporate 
staff 
by 
30 
percent 
and 
divisional 
staff 
by 
10 
percent 
(12/85). 
Exact 
number 
is 
not 
known. 
u. 
Acquirer 
(Burlington 
Northern) 
reduces 
its 
natural 
gas 
pipeline 
work 
force 
by 
30 
percent 
(8/86). 
Unclear 
how 
many 
of 
these 
are 
ex-Southland 
Royalty 
employees. 
v. 
One 
thousand 
five 
hundred 
and 
seventy 
Sperry 
workers 
were 
fired 
from 
its 
Bristol, 
Tennessee, 
facility 
and 
800 
from 
its 
Eagan. 
Minnesota, 
facility. 
Two 
other 
Sperry 
plants 
(in 
Voorhes. 
New 
Jersey. 
and 
Jackson, 
Minnesota) 
were 
closed; 
however, 
we 
do 
not 
have 
specific 
information 
on 
layoffs 
from 
these 
two 
plants. 
w. 
These 
4,000 
workers 
are 
white-collar 
employees. 
x. 
To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs, 
we 
assumed 
that 
500 
white-collar 
and 
200 
blue-collar 
employees 
were 
laid 
off. 
y. 
To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs, 
we 
assumed 
that 
these 
are 
blue-collar 
employees. 
z. 
To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs, 
we 
assumed 
that 
these 
are 
blue-collar 
employees. 
*To 
estimate 
savings 
from 
layoffs. 
we 
assumed 
that 
laid-off 
blue-collar 
(white-collar) 
employees 
were 
earning 
quasi 
rents 
worth 
$20,000 
($50,000). 26  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1990 
than the whole  premium.  Although  the means should be cut by about 
61 percent for the sample of all takeovers because in 33 cases  there is 
no  evidence  of  layoffs,  the  five-year  labor cost  savings  can  explain 
about 11 percent of the premium in an average takeover and permanent 
labor cost  savings  can explain  perhaps 26  percent.  With a 5 percent 
rather than a  10 percent discount  rate, these  numbers would  be  12.5 
percent and 52 percent, respectively.  On the other hand, if the marginal 
product of laid-off  workers is one-half  of their wage rather than zero, 
the savings  should be cut in half.  Labor cost  savings  are thus only  a 
moderate source of takeover gains. 
In table 3 white- and blue-collar  workers are grouped together. They 
are separated in tables  4  and 5.  For  13 companies  out of  21  we  can 
identify white-collar  layoffs,  and for 12 out of 21 we can identify blue- 
collar layoffs.  In cases where we could identify them, blue-collar layoffs 
average  1,493  workers,  or 6.5  percent of the firm's total work force, 
and save  an average of  11. 1 percent of the premium using a five-year 
horizon  and 29.2  percent  if  the gains  are permanent.  Among  the  12 
firms for  which  we  have  numbers,  white-collar  layoffs  average  660 
employees,  or 3.2  percent of  the firm's  total  work force,  which  can 
justify 33.6 percent of the premium on average using a five-year horizon 
and 88.3  percent using  a perpetuity.  Since  white-collar  wages  are as- 
sumed to be higher than blue-collar  wages,  the estimated savings from 
white-collar  layoffs  are higher than those from blue-collar layoffs  even 
though the layoffs  themselves  are smaller. 
White-collar  layoffs  are smaller  in number and as a percentage  of 
the total labor force  than blue-collar  layoffs,  but of course the white- 
collar labor force is on average much smaller than the blue-collar labor 
force of a firm. Virtually all laid-off white-collar workers in our sample 
are managerial and professional,  a group that constitutes 25 percent of 
U.S.  manufacturing employment,  compared with 61  percent for pro- 
duction  workers  and  14 percent for clerical  and sales.  If we  assume 
that our sample  firms have  a similar  occupational  structure,  we  can 
infer that the probability of layoff  for white-collar  workers is about 20 
percent higher than for blue-collar  workers.28 Because  we have several 
outliers,  it might be better to look  at median layoff  numbers that are 
28.  That  is, 0.2  =  (0.61/0.25)(3.2/6.5) -  1. Table 
4. 
White-Collar 
Employee 
Layoffs 
Subsequent 
to 
Takeover 
Bid, 
Sample 
Hostile 
Takeover 
Target 
Firms, 
1984-86 
Estimated 
savings 
from 
layoffs 
Layoffs 
Millions 
of 
dollars 
Percent 
of 
Percent 
of 
Present 
value 
at 
10 
Present 
value 
as 
total 
white-collar 
percent 
percent 
of 
premium 
Firm 
Number 
work 
force 
work 
force 
Annually 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
1. 
Allied 
Stores 
600 
1.0 
60.0 
30.0 
114.0 
300 
10.3 
27.1 
2. 
American 
Natural 
Resources 
153 
1.4 
n.a. 
7.7 
29.1 
77 
3.8 
10.1 
3. 
AMF 
350 
1.9 
87.5 
17.5 
66.5 
175 
89.9 
236.5 
4. 
Anderson 
Clayton 
200 
1.1 
n.a.a 
10.0 
38.0 
100 
35.2 
92.6 
5. 
CBS 
1,096 
3.7 
n.a. 
54.8 
208.2 
548 
7.6 
19.9 
6. 
Informatics 
General 
120 
4.6 
n.a. 
6.0 
22.8 
60 
81.4 
214.3 
7. 
Mayflower 
Group 
125 
5.0 
n.a. 
6.3 
23.8 
63 
37.8 
100.0 
8. 
Owens 
Coming 
Fiberglass 
853 
3.0 
n.a. 
42.65 
162.1 
427 
30.7 
80.8 
9. 
Ponderosa 
120 
0.5 
n.a. 
6.0 
22.8 
60 
33.5 
88.2 
10. 
Safeway 
300 
0.1 
25.0 
15.0 
57.0 
150 
3.8 
9.9 
11. 
Sanders 
Associates 
165 
2.1 
n.a. 
8.3 
31.4 
83 
5.1 
13.5 
12. 
Scovill 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a.b 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
13. 
Union 
Carbide 
4,000 
15.0 
n.a. 
200.0 
760.0 
2,000 
56.5 
148.8 
14. 
Uniroyal 
500 
2.5 
n.a.c 
25.0 
95.0 
250 
40.6 
106.8 
Average 
660 
3.2 
57.5 
31.3 
125.4 
330 
33.6 
88.3 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. 
n.a. 
Not 
available. 
a. 
CBS's 
1986 
annual 
report 
notes 
that 
nearly 
35 
percent 
of 
corporate 
staff 
was 
cut. 
b. 
Scovill 
cut 
corporate 
staff 
by 
30 
percent. 
c. 
"Company 
says 
that 
of 
20,000 
employees 
before 
the 
LBO 
19,300 
will 
still 
be 
working 
. 
. 
. 
although 
a 
headquarters 
staff 
in 
Middlebury, 
Connecticut, 
that 
totaled 
500 
people 
a 
year 
ago 
will 
just 
about 
disappear." Table 
5. 
Blue-Collar 
Employee 
Layoffs 
Subsequent 
to 
Takeover 
Bid, 
Sample 
Hostile 
Takeover 
Target 
Firms, 
1984-86 
Estimated 
savings 
from 
layoffs 
Layoffs 
Millions 
of 
dollars 
Present 
value 
at 
10 
Present 
value 
as 
Percent 
of 
percent 
percent 
of 
premium 
to 
ta 
l_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
Firm 
Number 
work 
force 
Annually 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
Five 
years 
Perpetuity 
1. 
Allied 
Stores 
2,025 
3.3 
40.5 
153.9 
405 
13.9 
36.6 
2. 
American 
Natural 
Resources 
247 
2.2 
4.9 
18.8 
49 
2.5 
6.4 
3. 
CBS 
396 
1.3 
7.9 
30.1 
79 
1.1 
2.9 
4. 
Chesebrough-Ponds 
400 
1.7 
8.0 
30.4 
80 
2.1 
5.6 
5. 
Fruehauf 
730 
2.8 
14.6 
55.5 
146 
13.4 
35.3 
6. 
Gillette 
2,400 
8.0 
48.0 
182.4 
480 
12.3 
32.4 
7. 
MidCon 
2,000 
23.9 
40.0 
152.0 
400 
10.8 
28.5 
8. 
Phillips 
Petroleum 
6,148 
24.3 
123.0 
467.4 
1,230 
38.3 
100.9 
9. 
Sperry 
2,370 
3.0 
7.4 
180.1 
474 
14.7 
38.8 
10. 
Uniroyal 
200 
1.0 
4.0 
15.2 
40 
6.5 
17.1 
11. 
Unocal 
600 
3.0 
12.0 
45.6 
120 
2.1 
5.4 
12. 
U.S. 
Industries 
400 
3.1 
8.0 
30.4 
80 
15.5 
40.8 
Average 
1,493 
6.5 
26.5 
113.5 
299 
11.1 
29.2 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  29 
2. 1 percent of  the labor force  for white-collar  workers and 3 percent 
for blue-collar  workers.  These  medians imply that the probability of a 
layoff  is  70  percent  higher  for white-collar  workers.29 In fact,  since 
most of the laid-off  workers are corporate staff,  and these workers are 
an even  smaller  fraction of  the labor force,  the odds of  a layoff  of  a 
corporate staff member are considerably higher than for any other class 
of worker. 
The most  common  reason for white-collar  layoffs  is consolidation 
of headquarters after a takeover. In some cases,  however,  such as those 
of CBS  and Union  Carbide,  white-collar  layoffs  are a large source of 
cost  savings  after unsuccessful  takeover attempts. Blue-collar  layoffs, 
in contrast,  typically  have  to do with  major retrenchments,  as in the 
case  of  Phillips  Petroleum.  In some  cases,  such as that of  Fruehauf, 
plant closings  also lead to blue-collar  layoffs. 
Table  6  compares  layoffs  in  successful,  unsuccessful,  and white 
knight takeovers.  We discuss  first the results for a subsample in which 
layoffs  actually  occurred  and then  the  unconditional  results  for  the 
whole  sample. 
Of the 21 target firms for which  we could quantify layoffs,  7 were 
successfully  taken over,  7 were  acquired by white  knights,  and 7 re- 
mained independent. Both in terms of raw numbers and as a percentage 
of the labor force, firms that remain independent have the highest layoffs 
for blue-  and white-collar  employees  combined.  The  fraction  of  the 
takeover  premium  that can  be  explained  by  savings  from  layoffs  is 
highest  for targets  of  successful  takeovers-37.9  percent,  compared 
with 16.8 percent for firms acquired by white knights, and 26.6  percent 
for firms that remained independent.  The much higher fraction of the 
premium accounted  for by layoffs  after successful  takeovers  is  some 
evidence  in favor of breach of trust, as argued by Shleifer and Summers. 
In the table 6 subsample in which blue- and white-collar  layoffs  are 
separated, we  again find that white-collar  layoffs  are most significant 
as a fraction of  the labor force  in targets that remained independent, 
but that savings from such layoffs are largest among targets of successful 
takeovers.  With blue-collar  layoffs,  targets that remained independent 
again had the largest fraction of  the labor force  laid off,  but the dif- 
29. That is, 0.7  =  (0.61/0.25)(2.1/3.0) -  1. Table 
6. 
Post-Takeover 
Attempt 
Layoffs 
Classified 
by 
Outcome 
of 
Hostile 
Takeover 
Bida 
Item 
Successfulb 
White 
knightc 
Independentd 
Total 
number 
of 
sample 
target 
firms 
30 
20 
12 
Number 
of 
target 
firms 
for 
which 
we 
found 
no 
public 
documentation 
of 
layoff 
information 
10 
8 
4 
Number 
of 
firms 
that 
experienced 
some 
employee 
layoff 
subsequent 
to 
the 
takeover 
bid 
13 
7 
8 
Firms 
whose 
employee 
layoffs 
we 
were 
able 
to 
document 
exactly 
Number 
of 
firms 
7 
7 
7 
Average 
number 
of 
workers 
laid 
off 
912 
642 
2,231 
Average 
percent 
of 
work 
force 
laid 
off 
3.0 
5.0 
9.0 
Average 
estimated 
savings 
from 
layoffs 
annually 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
24.0 
17.8 
70.7 
Present 
value 
of 
estimated 
savings 
from 
layoffs 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
91.2 
[240] 
67.8 
[178] 
268.5 
[707] 
Average 
of 
present 
value 
of 
estimated 
savings 
from 
layoffs 
as 
a 
percent 
of 
premium 
offered 
for 
the 
target 
37.9 
[99.81 
16.8 
[26.7] 
26.6 
[70.2] 
Firms 
whose 
white-collar 
employee 
layoffs 
we 
were 
able 
to 
document 
exactly  Number 
of 
firms 
5 
4 
4 
Average 
number 
of 
white-collar 
layoffs 
268.6 
291 
1,519 
Average 
percent 
of 
total 
work 
force 
laid 
off 
1.9 
1.5 
6.7 
Average 
percent 
of 
white-collar 
work 
force 
laid 
off 
73.8e 
25.0 
n.a. 
Average 
estimated 
savings 
from 
white-collar 
layoffs 
annually 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
13.4 
14.6 
75.9 Present 
value 
of 
estimated 
savings 
from 
white-collar 
layoffs 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
51.0 
[134.4] 
55.4 
[146] 
289 
[759] 
Average 
of 
present 
value 
of 
estimated 
savings 
from 
white-collar 
layoffs 
as 
a 
percent 
of 
premium 
offered 
for 
the 
target 
43.8 
[115.2] 
21.2 
[55.7] 
33.2 
[87.4] 
Firms 
whose 
blue-collar 
employee 
layoffs 
we 
were 
able 
to 
document 
exactly  Number 
of 
firms 
4 
4 
4 
Average 
number 
of 
blue-collar 
layoffs 
1,261 
832 
2,386 
Average 
percent 
of 
total 
work 
force 
laid 
off 
2.9 
7.4 
9.2 
Average 
estimated 
savings 
from 
blue-collar 
layoffs 
annually 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
15.2 
16.7 
47.7 
Present 
value 
of 
estimated 
savings 
from 
blue-collar 
layoffs 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
95.8 
[252] 
63.3 
[167] 
181 
[477] 
Average 
of 
present 
value 
of 
estimated 
savings 
from 
blue-collar 
layoffs 
as 
a 
percent 
of 
premium 
offered 
for 
the 
target 
11.6 
[30.6] 
8.2 
[21.6] 
13.4 
[35.4] 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. 
n.a. 
Not 
available. 
a. 
The 
sample 
target 
firms 
constitute 
an 
exhaustive 
sample 
of 
targets 
of 
hostile 
takeover 
bids 
of 
U.S. 
firms 
during 
1984-86 
where 
the 
value 
of 
the 
initial 
offer 
was 
more 
than 
$50 
million. 
Calculations 
are 
for 
five-year 
savings 
from 
layoffs; 
calculations 
in 
brackets 
are 
for 
perpetual 
savings. 
b. 
The 
bidding 
firm 
is 
successful 
in 
acquiring 
the 
target. 
c. 
The 
target 
is 
acquired 
by 
a 
white 
knight. 
d. 
The 
target 
remains 
independent. 
e. 
Based 
on 
2 
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ferences  in percentage of the premium accounted for by layoffs  are no 
longer  as large.  These  results provide  mixed  evidence  for the breach 
of trust hypothesis.  On the one hand, that white knights seem to make 
fewer layoffs  than successful  hostile  acquirers, particularly when mea- 
sured as a percentage of the premium saved, suggests that white knights 
breach fewer contracts than do the hostile acquirers. This is as predicted 
by the theory.  On the other hand, we find that managers of firms that 
remain independent themselves  lay off  a lot of  workers-both  white- 
and blue-collar.  Perhaps targets that remain independent, unlike white 
knights,  continue to be under pressure, which explains the greater lay- 
offs. 
One further nice piece of evidence  illustrates the difference between 
successful  acquirers and white knights. In the 30 instances of successful 
hostile  takeovers,  we  have  evidence  of  10 closings  or sales  of  head- 
quarters; in the 20 instances  of white knight acquisitions,  we have no 
evidence  of closings  or sales of headquarters. If the sale of headquarters 
reflects breach of trust, this evidence  shows clearly that hostile acquirers 
breach trust but that white  knights do not. 
The findings just described are for the subsample in which the layoffs 
actually occurred and can be measured. To understand the importance 
of  layoffs  in all takeovers,  we  must correct for the fact that in more 
than half the cases there is no evidence  of layoffs.  With the correction, 
the finding that targets that remain independent laid off  most aggres- 
sively  is strengthened.  They  laid off  an average of 6.3  percent of the 
labor force,  compared  with  1.75  percent  for white  knights,  and 0.9 
percent for successful  acquirers. The unconditional fraction of takeover 
premium explained  by savings  from layoffs  is  18.6 percent for targets 
that remained independent, 5.9 percent for white knights, and 11 percent 
for successful  acquirers. Thus the evidence  on white knights as against 
successful  acquirers is mixed,  but the aggressive  layoffs  by targets that 
remained independent indicate that they continue to be under the pres- 
sure of takeovers. 
An objection  to this analysis  of  layoffs  is that we  do not compare 
post-takeover  layoffs  with  pre-takeover  layoffs  in the  same  firms or 
with layoffs  in other firms in the same industry. If layoffs  reflect only 
industry trends, then takeovers cannot be responsible for them. But this 
argument is flawed.  If fear of takeover is responsible  for industry lay- 
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Advocates  of  takeovers  often  credit takeover pressure for eliminating 
inefficient  investment  throughout the oil  industry and not just  in ac- 
quired firms. They do not give takeover pressure credit for industrywide 
employment  reductions,  but the logic  is the same. 
High costs of collecting  data prevent us from conducting our analysis 
on the industries of  acquired firms, but we  made a few  comparisons. 
First, we looked  at the Wall Street Journal for evidence  of layoffs  for 
our 62 sample firms in the two years before the takeover attempt. The 
Wall Street Journal is not the only source of layoff  information for our 
sample,  but it is by far the dominant source.  We have found evidence 
of layoffs  in 8 firms before the takeover period,  compared with 28  in 
the post-takeover  period.  Of  these,  6  were  firms that also  had post- 
takeover layoffs.  The average layoff was 275 employees,  or 0.6 percent 
of the affected firm'  s employment.  This translates into the unconditional 
average  layoff  of  35 employees,  or less  than 0. 1 percent of the labor 
force,  which  is much smaller than the post-takeover  unconditional  av- 
erage. Layoffs  after the takeover are clearly greater than layoffs before. 
This evidence  supports the idea that managers of hostile takeover targets 
are reluctant to breach implicit  contracts unless  thrown out or forced 
to do so under takeover pressure. 
To examine  industry layoffs,  we matched each firm in the sample to 
a similar-sized  firm in the same industry. We then used the Wall Street 
Journal to examine layoff practices of control firms over the same period 
as the sample firms. We have found that 11 control firms experienced 
layoffs  during the  relevant  period,  averaging  539  employees,  or 5.2 
percent of their work forces.  The implied unconditional expected layoff 
for the whole  control  sample  is  100 employees,  or 0.5  percent of the 
work force-obviously  much less  than for the post-takeover  sample. 
Although  these  results  are biased  down by the use of  the Wall Street 
Journal  only,  layoffs  in control  firms measured in this way  are very 
significantly  smaller. The implication is that takeovers do cause layoffs. 
In addition to layoffs,  hostile  takeovers often result in pension plan 
terminations accompanied by reversions of excess  pension assets to the 
acquirer.  Pontiff,  Shleifer,  and Weisbach  document  the  increase  in 
reversion  activity  after takeovers,  and the greater frequency  of  such 
reversions  following  hostile  takeovers.30 In our sample,  there is evi- 
30.  Pontiff,  Shleifer,  and Weisbach (1989). 34  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
dence that 14 firms reverted pension plans after the takeover. Although 
in  most  cases  these  reversions  are small,  in  a few,  such as those  of 
Union  Carbide,  NL  Industries,  and Jonathan Logan,  reversions  are a 
large fraction of the premium. Even if one takes the estimate of Pontiff, 
Shleifer,  and Weisbach  that only  a third of the excess  pension  assets, 
on  average,  would  have  gone  to  the  employees  were  it  not  for  the 
reversion, one still gets nontrivial transfers in a few cases. This evidence 
confirms that pension  reversions  are common  in hostile  takeovers but 
rarely justify  a large fraction of the premium. 
In sum,  layoffs  after takeovers  are common  and can explain  10-20 
percent  of  the  premium.  Moreover,  layoffs  seem  to  be  much  more 
common  in our sample firms than in other firms in their industries.  At 
the same time,  layoffs  are clearly  not the whole  story behind hostile 
takeovers,  and it is hard to believe that plans for future layoffs constitute 
an important takeover  motive.  The direct consequences  of  takeovers 
for U.S.  employment  are trivial.  Layoffs  are a common by-product of 
the hostile  takeover process  but do not appear to be the driving force 
behind it. 
The Importance of Selloffs after Takeovers 
In this section,  we compute the value of divestitures following  hostile 
takeovers.  As  with  layoffs,  we  look  at all  post-takeover  divestitures 
during three calendar years starting from the year of the takeover.  We 
followed  the same strategy as with layoffs,  making sure that the sold- 
off  assets  are from the target. When it proved impossible  to attribute 
the divestiture to the target, we counted it as zero. This was the biggest 
problem  when  the target and the bidder are in the same industry and 
have relatively  homogeneous  assets,  such as gas pipelines.  The main 
sources of information on divestitures are Moody's  and the Wall Street 
Journal,  although annual reports and lOKs also proved useful.  In most 
cases  we found prices of divestitures;  otherwise,  the divestiture is not 
counted.  The  restriction  that divestitures  must be  identified  with  the 
target and have a reported price biases our count of divestitures down- 
ward. 
In computing  the total value  of divestitures,  we did not correct for 
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aggressive  calculation  during a period of rising stock prices,  although 
it is not clear that a rising  stock market always raises the value that a 
rational buyer is  willing  to pay for a division.  We were conservative 
in taking the debt assumed  by  a buyer of  a division  to be zero,  thus 
reducing  the price that might have been effectively  paid.  Given  these 
approximations,  as well  as the fact that some  divestitures  might have 
gone  unreported, our estimates  should be viewed  as rough. 
The results of this calculation,  presented in table 7,  reveal a signif- 
icant number of selloffs  in most takeovers.  The average portion of the 
acquisition price realized through selloffs  is 29.6 percent and the median 
is  16.6  percent.  In only  20 cases  out of 62 were there no quantifiable 
selloffs,  and even  in some of these cases,  such as that of Aegis,  there 
were selloffs,  but we could  not find the price.  In 17 cases,  more than 
half the acquisition  price was regained through selloffs,  and in 3 cases 
more than 100 percent was regained.  It is absolutely  clear from these 
data that selling off divisions  is one of the most pervasive consequences 
of hostile  takeovers. 
Who Makes Divestitures? 
There are a variety of selloff  styles.  Some cases  are classic  bustups 
in which  the bidding  firm does  not seem  to retain much of the target 
at all.  Examples  include  Revlon's  acquisition  of Frigitronics and First 
City's  acquisition  of Scovill.  Not surprisingly,  such complete  bustups 
are typically  done by the raiders. We do not know whether the purpose 
is to take advantage of the underpricing of the target, to sell divisions 
to  strategic  buyers  at inflated prices,  to  enable  eventual  acquirers to 
implement significant changes,  or all three. Even in complete bustups, 
the takeover artist usually gets some benefits from headquarters layoffs. 
Another, and perhaps more interesting, case of nearly complete bust- 
ups are acquisitions of conglomerates for the purposes of retaining some 
pieces  of  them.  For  example,  when  Quaker Oats  bought  Anderson 
Clayton,  it retained the Gaines dog food business that it had previously 
sought  and sold off  everything  else.  Another example  is James Gold- 
smith,  which bought Crown Zellerback and sold off everything but the 
timber properties. A third example  is Minstar, which bought AMF and 
Aegis  and  sold  off  most  assets  other than the  boat  divisions  that it 
wanted. In these examples,  the acquirer got the segment of the company Table 
7. 
Selloffs 
as 
a 
Fraction 
of 
the 
Acquisition 
Price 
Millions 
of 
dollars 
except 
as 
noted 
Ratio 
of 
Price 
selloffs 
Target 
Bidder 
(debt 
+ 
equity) 
Selloffs 
to 
price 
1. 
Aegis 
Minstar 
79.00 
0 
. 
. 
. 
2. 
American 
Motor 
Inn 
Prime 
Motor 
Inn 
305.00 
383.70 
1.258 
3. 
Allied 
Stores 
Campeau 
4,364.00 
2,500.00 
0.573 
4. 
American 
Natural 
Resources 
Coastal 
3,525.00 
0 
... 
5. 
AMF 
Minstar 
715.00 
511.00 
0.715 
6. 
Anderson 
Clayton 
Quaker 
Oatsa 
824.00 
535.00 
0.649 
7. 
Atlas 
Van 
Linesb 
Wesraya 
76.60 
0 
... 
8. 
Avondale 
Mills 
Walton 
Monroe 
Millsa 
150.60 
18.00 
0.120 
9. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedc 
1,621.00 
333.00 
0.205 
10. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedc 
2,650.00 
213.00 
0.080 
11. 
CBS 
Turner 
Broadcastingc 
5,781.00 
3,440.00 
0.595 
12. 
Chesebrough-Ponds 
Unilevera 
4,270.00 
1,800.00 
0.422 
13. 
Cluett 
Peabody 
Westpoint 
Pepperella 
499.00 
0 
. 
. 
. 
14. 
Crown 
Zellerbach 
James 
Goldsmith 
1,848.00 
1,146.00 
0.620 
15. 
Easco 
Equity 
Group 
265.00 
13.00 
0.049 
16. 
Frigitronics 
Revlon 
123.00 
120.00 
0.976 
17. 
Frontier 
Holdings 
People 
Expressa 
342.00 
0 
. 
.. 
18. 
Fruehaufb 
Fruehauf 
Holdinga 
1,580.00 
732.00 
0.463 
19. 
Gillette 
Revlonc 
4,556.00 
50.00 
0.011 
20. 
Great 
Lakes 
International 
Itel 
200.00 
31.00 
0.155 21. 
Gulton 
Mark 
IV 
Industries 
122.00 
0 
22. 
Hammermill 
Paper 
International 
Papera 
1,410.00 
0 
23. 
Hook 
Drugs 
Krogera 
174.00 
0 
24. 
Houston 
Natural 
Gas 
Coastalc 
3,080.00 
544.00 
0.177 
25. 
Imperial 
Continental 
Gas 
Gulf 
Resourcesc 
1,205.00 
717.00 
0.595 
26. 
Informatics 
General 
Sterling 
Software 
127.00 
34.00 
0.268 
27. 
John 
Blair 
Reliance 
Capitala 
596.00 
377.00 
0.633 
28. 
Jonathan 
Logan 
UMM 
214.00 
17.00 
0.079 
29. 
Joy 
Technologiesb 
Joy 
Manufacturinga 
716.00 
252.00 
0.352 
30. 
Masland 
Burlington 
Industries 
136.50 
0 
... 
31. 
Mayflower 
Laidlawc 
320.00 
25.00 
0.078 
32. 
McGraw-Edison 
Cooper 
Industries 
1,400.00 
177.00 
0.126 
33. 
Medford 
Amalgamated 
Sugar 
145.00 
38.00 
0.262 
34. 
MidCon 
Occidental 
Petroleuma 
3,900.00 
1,470.00 
0.377 
35. 
National 
Gypsumb 
Management 
Groupa 
1,720.00 
441.00 
0.256 
36. 
NL 
Industries 
Harold 
Simmons 
900.00 
0 
... 
37. 
Owens 
Coming 
Fiberglass 
Wickesc 
2,640.00 
595.00 
0.225 
38. 
Pacific 
Lumber 
Maxxam 
916.00 
351.00 
0.383 
39. 
Phillips 
Petroleum 
Carl 
Icahnc 
11,340.00 
2,000.00 
0.176 
40. 
Ponderosa 
Edelman 
328.00 
17.00 
0.052 
41. 
Prentice 
Hall 
Gulf 
and 
Western 
708.00 
0 
. 
.. 
42. 
Quotron 
Citicorp 
687.00 
0 
... 
43. 
Revlon 
Pantry 
Pride 
2,285.00 
2,060.00 
0.902 
44. 
Richardson-Vicks 
Proctor 
and 
Gamblea 
1,830.00 
106.00 
0.058 
45. 
Ryan 
Homes 
HV 
Homes 
348.00 
0 Table 
7. 
(continued) 
Ratio 
of 
Price 
selloffs 
Target 
Bidder 
(debt 
+ 
equity) 
Selloffs 
to 
price 
46. 
Safewayb 
KKRa 
5,300.00 
3,200.00 
0.604 
47. 
Saga 
Marriott 
607.00 
306.00 
0.504 
48. 
Sanders 
Associates 
Lockheeda 
1,199.00 
0 
... 
49. 
SCM 
Hanson 
Trust 
1,188.50 
920.00 
0.774 
50. 
Scovill 
First 
City 
Properties 
627.00 
680.70 
1.086 
51. 
Southland 
Royalty 
Burlington 
Northern 
1,034.00 
0 
. 
. 
. 
52. 
Sperry 
Burroughs 
5,470.00 
1,800.00 
0.329 
53. 
Strawbridge 
& 
Clothier 
Berryc 
480.00 
0 
... 
54. 
Tull 
Industries 
Bethlehem 
Steela 
106.00 
0 
. 
. 
. 
55. 
Unidynamics 
Cranea 
251.00 
0 
. 
. 
. 
56. 
Union 
Carbideb 
GAFC 
8,000.00 
4,500.00 
0.563 
57. 
Uniroyalb 
Clayton-Dubiliera 
1,001.00 
935.00 
0.934 
58. 
Unocal 
Mesa 
Partnersc 
10,500.00 
40.00 
0.004 
59. 
U.S. 
Industries 
Hanson 
Trust 
572.00 
178.00 
0.311 
60. 
Van 
Dusen 
Air 
APL 
Partnership 
77.00 
101.50 
1.318 
61. 
Westchester 
Financial 
Service 
Marine 
Midland 
Banka 
102.00 
0 
... 
62. 
White 
Consolidated 
Electrolux 
923.00 
0 
. 
. 
. 
Average 
values 
1,735.70 
539.34 
0.296 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. 
a. 
White 
Knight. 
b. 
LBO. 
c. 
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it wanted for an extremely  low  price and managed to get most  of  its 
money back through divestitures.  These near-bustups suggest that even 
apparent bustup takeovers  might be driven by the strategic objectives 
of the acquirers,  with  selloffs  being  an incidental  consequence  of the 
pursuit of particular businesses. 
In about a third of the cases there are no selloffs  at all,  and in a few 
selloffs are minor. Examples of such low-selloff takeovers include Coastal 
acquiring  American  Natural Resources  (both  are pipelines),  Walton 
Monroe Mills  acquiring Avondale  Mills  (both are textile  firms), West- 
point Pepperell acquiring Cluett Peabody (both are textile  firms), Gulf 
and Western acquiring Prentice Hall (both are in publishing),  and Ci- 
ticorp  acquiring  Quotron  (to  pursue  the  alleged  complementarity  of 
banking and provision  of  stock  quotations).  As  we  argue later in the 
paper,  such  strategic  acquisitions  of  whole  or parts of companies  are 
an extremely  important part of  the hostile  takeover process.  Without 
these wholly  strategic bids,  the average fraction of assets sold off after 
hostile  takeovers  would be even  larger. 
Several  insights  about  the  reasons  for  selloffs  can  be  gained  by 
looking at different types of transactions. When we compare LBOs with 
non-LBOs,  we  find that the mean portion of the acquisition  price rea- 
lized through selloffs  in the two cases are 43.5  percent and 28. 1 percent, 
respectively,  and the medians are 40.7  percent and 12.3  percent.  The 
incidence  of  selloffs  is  higher after LBOs,  especially  judging  by the 
medians,  which  suggests  that the pressure from debt is  a reason  for 
some  selloffs.  When  we  compare  successful  and unsuccessful  takeo- 
vers,  we do not find much difference  in the fraction of the acquisition 
price recovered through selloffs.  This finding suggests,  as did our results 
on layoffs,  that firms escaping the takeover often do most of the things 
that the acquirer would  have done anyway.  Finally,  we do find fewer 
selloffs  by white  knights than by hostile  acquirers.  In the means,  the 
portion is 24.3  percent for the former and 36.5  percent for the latter. 
In the  medians,  the  ratio  is  8.9  percent  for  white  knights  and 20.9 
percent for hostile  acquirers. The picture is similar to that with layoffs 
and headquarters closures:  white  knights  do less  than the hostile  ac- 
quirers, but firms remaining  independent have to make more changes 
than those  acquired  by  a white  knight.  The  explanation  that targets 
remaining  independent  continue  to be under pressure applies  here as 
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Who Are the Buyers in Divestitures? 
Perhaps the most interesting question for understanding the function 
of divestitures is who the buyers are. If the function of hostile takeovers 
is  to  create  organizations  with  appropriate incentives,  such  as  high 
management ownership  and high debt, then one would expect  a lot of 
divestitures to MBO teams or to investment companies.  If the function 
of  hostile  takeovers  is to allocate  businesses  to strategic buyers,  then 
one would expect most divestitures to be to strategic buyers. To examine 
these issues,  we divide divestitures into those to strategic buyers (those 
in a business  related to that of the acquired division),  those to MBOs 
and investment  companies,  and those to unrelated acquirers. We also 
have two  residual  categories.  The first is a small category  consisting 
of headquarters buildings,  stocks,  and other liquid assets that are sold 
off.  The second  is the selloffs  for which we cannot identify the buyer. 
Table  8,  which  presents the results for each firm, shows  that most 
selloffs  go to acquirers in the same industry. The total volume of selloffs 
in this sample is $33.7  billion.  Of those,  $23.70  billion,  or 70 percent, 
were  selloffs  of  divisions  to firms with lines  of business  the same as 
or closely  related to those  of the divisions.  Compared with that, $5.4 
billion,  or 16 percent, were sold off to MBOs or investment companies, 
and $2.8  billion,  or 8 percent,  to  unrelated acquirers.  We  could  not 
identify  the buyers  in 4 percent of  the  sold-off  assets,  and 2 percent 
were headquarters and marketable assets  selloffs. 
Selloffs,  clearly,  go  mainly  to related acquirers.  Such  selloffs  are 
four times  more  important than those  to MBOs  and other incentive- 
intensive  arrangements. Even if we assume that all of the 4 percent of 
asset  sales  for which  we  could  not identify  the buyer are to an MBO 
or an investment company,  we still get the result that selloffs  to related 
buyers are three and one-half  times  more important. 
These  results present a different view  of divestitures than that sug- 
gested  by  Jensen,  who  views  the  large  incidence  of  divestitures  as 
evidence  that mergers do not increase concentration.31 Divestitures  in 
fact seem to increase concentration (using industry-level  measures em- 
ployed  by  antitrust authorities),  because  the  buyers  of  divisions  are 
typically  not the raiders or MBO boutiques but large firms in the same 
31.  Jensen (1988). Table 
8. 
Selloffs, 
by 
Type 
of 
Acquirer 
Millions 
of 
dollars 
Total 
Headquarters, 
Not 
Target 
Bidder 
selloffs 
Related 
Unrelated 
MBOs 
securities 
identified 
1. 
Aegis 
Minstar 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2. 
American 
Motor 
Inn 
Prime 
Motor 
Inn 
384 
66 
0 
318 
0 
0 
3. 
Allied 
Stores 
Campeau 
2,500 
2,425 
0 
75 
0 
0 
4. 
American 
Natural 
Resources 
Coastal 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5. 
AMF 
Minstar 
511 
100 
0 
411 
0 
0 
6. 
Anderson 
Clayton 
Quaker 
Oatsa 
535 
235 
0 
100 
0 
200 
7. 
Atlas 
Van 
Linesb 
Wesraya 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8. 
Avondale 
Mills 
Walton 
Monroe 
Millsa 
18 
0 
0 
0 
18 
0 
9. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedc 
333 
333 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedc 
213 
213 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11. 
CBS 
Turner 
Broadcastingc 
3,440 
3,440 
0 
0 
0 
0 
12. 
Chesebrough-Ponds 
Unilevera 
1,800 
1,800 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13. 
Cluett 
Peabody 
Westpoint 
Pepperella 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14. 
Crown 
Zellerbach 
James 
Goldsmith 
1,146 
800 
0 
246 
100 
0 
15. 
Easco 
Equity 
Group 
13 
13 
0 
0 
0 
0 
16. 
Frigitronics 
Revlon 
120 
100 
0 
20 
0 
0 
17. 
Frontier 
Holdings 
People 
Expressa 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
18. 
Fruehaufb 
Fruehauf 
Holdinga 
732 
627 
0 
0 
0 
105 
19. 
Gillette 
Revlonc 
50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
50 
20. 
Great 
Lakes 
International 
Itel 
31 
20 
0 
0 
11 
0 
21. 
Gulton 
Mark 
IV 
Industries 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
22. 
Hammermill 
Paper 
International 
Papera 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
23. 
Hook 
Drugs 
Krogera 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24. 
Houston 
Natural 
Gas 
Coastalc 
544 
489 
0 
55 
0 
0 
25. 
Imperial 
Continental 
Gas 
Gulf 
Resourcesc 
448 
448 
0 
0 
0 
0 Table 
8. 
(continued) 
Total 
Headquarters, 
Not 
Target 
Bidder 
selloffs 
Related 
Unrelated 
MBOs 
securities 
identified 
26. 
Informatics 
General 
Sterling 
Software 
34 
20 
0 
0 
0 
14 
27. 
John 
Blair 
Reliance 
Capitala 
377 
241 
0 
136 
0 
0 
28. 
Jonathan 
Logan 
UMM 
17 
0 
0 
0 
17 
0 
29. 
Joy 
Technologiesb 
Joy 
Manufacturinga 
252 
252 
0 
0 
0 
0 
30. 
Masland 
Burlington 
Industries 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
31. 
Mayflower 
Group 
Laidlawc 
25 
0 
0 
20 
0 
5 
32. 
McGraw-Edison 
Cooper 
Industries 
177 
105 
0 
45 
0 
27 
33. 
Medford 
Amalgamated 
Sugar 
38 
0 
0 
0 
0 
38 
34. 
MidCon 
Occidental 
Petroleuma 
1,470 
1,470 
0 
0 
0 
0 
35. 
National 
Gypsumb 
Management 
Groupa 
441 
348 
0 
27 
0 
66 
36. 
NL 
Industries 
Harold 
Simmons 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37. 
Owens 
Corning 
Fiberglass 
Wickesc 
595 
240 
0 
267 
0 
88 
38. 
Pacific 
Lumber 
Maxxam 
351 
0 
0 
320 
31 
0 
39. 
Phillips 
Petroleum 
Carl 
Icahnc 
2,000 
1,890 
0 
0 
110 
0 
40. 
Ponderosa 
Edelman 
17 
17 
0 
0 
0 
0 
41. 
Prentice 
Hall 
Gulf 
and 
Western 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
42. 
Quotron 
Citicorp 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
43. 
Revlon 
Pantry 
Pride 
2,060 
1,185 
0 
875 
0 
0 
44. 
Richardson-Vicks 
Procter 
and 
Gamblea 
106 
0 
66 
40 
0 
0 
45. 
Ryan 
Homes 
HV 
Homes 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
46. 
Safewayb 
KKRa 
3,200 
3,035 
0 
165 
0 
0 
47. 
Saga 
Marriott 
306 
0 
0 
306 
0 
0 
48. 
Sanders 
Associates 
Lockheeda 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
49. 
SCM 
Hanson 
Trust 
920 
884 
0 
0 
0 
36 
50. 
Scovill 
First 
City 
Properties 
689 
229 
460 
0 
0 
0 51. 
Southland 
Royalty 
Burlington 
Northern 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
52. 
Sperry 
Burroughs 
1,800 
1,200 
0 
600 
0 
0 
53. 
Strawbridge 
& 
Clothier 
Berryc 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
54. 
Tull 
Industries 
Bethlehem 
Steela 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55. 
Unidynamics 
Cranea 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
56. 
Union 
Carbide 
GAFC 
4,500 
890 
1,420 
1,260 
340 
590 
57. 
Uniroyalb 
Clayton-Dubiliera 
935 
100 
835 
0 
0 
0 
58. 
Unocal 
Mesa 
Partnersc 
40 
0 
0 
0 
40 
0 
59. 
U.S. 
Industries 
Hanson 
Trust 
178 
64 
0 
114 
0 
0 
60. 
Van 
Dusen 
Air 
APL 
Partnership 
102 
102 
0 
0 
0 
0 
61. 
Westchester 
Financial 
Services 
Marine 
Midland 
Banka 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
62. 
White 
Consolidated 
Electrolux 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
33,717 
23,650 
2,781 
5,400 
667 
1,219 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. 
a. 
White 
Knight. 
b. 
LBO. 
c. 
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lines  of  business.  In fact,  the role of the raiders and MBO boutiques 
seems to be largely to take diversified firms, bust them up, and sell the 
divisions  to other firms in the same business.  Management buyout or- 
ganizers  and raiders thus  serve  as  brokers working  for the  ultimate 
purpose of increased concentration.  Their goal is to create a temporary 
organization  that facilitates  the allocation  of  assets to related buyers. 
Of course, debt and concentrated ownership create significant incentives 
for them to do a bustup. The evidence is clear that the goal of divestitures 
is typically to realize gains from industry consolidation,  not to improve 
performance through an incentive-intensive  organizational  form. 
Analysis of Sources of Target Shareholders' Wealth Gains 
In table 9 we  summarize the motives  and the sources of gains that 
might have been important in each transaction. We look at the impor- 
tance of strategic factors,  selloffs,  layoffs,  tax savings,  and investment 
cuts. 
In three cases,  we  have  not been  able to find any clear sources  of 
gain or takeover motives.  The first is Revlon's  bid for Gillette,  which 
probably was intended to result in a bustup. However,  Gillette did not 
make  significant  selloffs  after defeating  the bid,  and its employment 
cuts, while large, could not have justified a large fraction of the proposed 
premium. As a result,  we cannot clearly infer what Revlon was up to. 
The second case is Berry's unsuccessful  bid for Strawbridge and Cloth- 
ier, which was rapidly defeated by a controlling family and resulted in 
no changes.  This  observation  is hard to  fathom.  Finally,  we  did not 
identify  important sources  of  gains  in Hanson Trust's  acquisition  of 
U.S.  Industries. It is often said that operations are improved after Han- 
son's  acquisitions,  but we do not have adequate measures of that, and 
the measures we  do have did not register significant changes. 
The Importance of Strategic Acquisitions 
Table 9 shows  that 34 out of 62 acquisitions  were strategically mo- 
tivated. In most cases,  the bidder was interested in the majority of assets 
of the target company.  Such acquisitions thus reflect the same phenom- 
enon that appears to underlie most friendly takeovers in the 1980s: firms Table 
9. 
Classification 
of 
Transactions 
by 
Sources 
of 
Gains 
Key 
source 
of 
gain 
Strategic 
Layoffs 
Tax 
Investment 
Target 
Bidder 
factors 
Bustupa 
or 
pensionsb 
savings' 
cuts 
1. 
Aegis 
Minstar 
S 
Debt 
2. 
American 
Motor 
Inn 
Prime 
Motor 
Inn 
S 
B 
Partn 
3. 
Allied 
Stores 
Campeau 
S 
B 
-> 
S 
W, 
B 
4. 
American 
Natural 
Resources 
Coastal 
S 
Debt 
Maybe 
5. 
AMF 
Minstar 
S 
B 
W 
6. 
Anderson 
Clayton 
Quaker 
Oatsd 
S 
B 
W 
7. 
Atlas 
Van 
Linese 
Wesrayd 
Debt 
8. 
Avondale 
Mills 
Walton 
Monroe 
Millsd 
S 
9. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedf 
S 
10. 
Carter 
Hawley 
Hale 
The 
Limitedf 
S 
11. 
CBS 
Turner 
Broadcastingf 
S 
B 
-- 
S 
12. 
Chesebrough-Ponds 
Unileverd 
S 
13. 
Cluett 
Peabody 
Westpoint 
Pepperelld 
S 
Debt 
14. 
Crown 
Zellerbach 
James 
Goldsmith 
B 
> 
S 
15. 
Easco 
Equity 
Group 
B 
16. 
Frigitronics 
Revlon 
B 
-- 
S 
17. 
Frontier 
Holdings 
People 
Expressd 
S 
18. 
Fruehaufe 
Fruehauf 
Holdingd 
B 
19. 
Gillette 
Revlonf 
20. 
Great 
Lakes 
International 
Itel 
NOLs Table 
9. 
(continued) 
Key 
source 
of 
gain 
Strategic 
Layoffs 
Tax 
Investment 
Target 
Bidder 
factors 
Bustupa 
or 
pensionsb 
savingsc 
cuts 
21. 
Gulton 
Mark 
IV 
Industries 
Debt 
22. 
Hammermill 
Paper 
International 
Paperd 
S 
23. 
Hook 
Drugs 
Krogerd 
S 
24. 
Houston 
Natural 
Gas 
Coastalf 
S 
Maybe 
25. 
Imperial 
Continental 
Gas 
Gulf 
Resourcesf 
B 
S 
26. 
Informatics 
General 
Sterling 
Software 
S 
W 
Debt 
27. 
John 
Blair 
Reliance 
Capitald 
S 
B 
S 
28. 
Jonathan 
Logan 
UMM 
S 
P 
NOLs 
29. 
Joy 
Technologiese 
Joy 
Manufacturingd 
Debt 
30. 
Masland 
Burlington 
Industries 
S 
31. 
Mayflower 
Group 
Laidlawf 
S 
W 
Debt 
32. 
McGraw-Edison 
Cooper 
Industries 
S 
33. 
Medford 
Amalgamated 
Sugar 
Yes 
34. 
MidCon 
Occidental 
Petroleumd 
S 
35. 
National 
Gypsume 
Management 
Groupd 
Debt 
Yes 
36. 
NL 
Industries 
Harold 
Simmons 
37. 
Owens 
Coming 
Fiberglass 
Wickesf 
W 
Debt 
Yes 
38. 
Pacific 
Lumber 
Maxxam 
Yes 
39. 
Phillips 
Petroleum 
Carl 
Icahnf 
B, 
P 
Debt 
Yes 
40. 
Ponderosa 
Edelman 
w 
41. 
Prentice 
Hall 
Gulf 
and 
Western 
S 
42. 
Quotron 
Citicorp 
S 
43. 
Revlon 
Pantry 
Pride 
B 
S 
44. 
Richardson-Vicks 
Procter 
and 
Gambled 
S 
Debt 
45. 
Ryan 
Homes 
HV 
Homes 
S 
Partn 46. 
Safewaye 
KKRd 
B 
> 
S 
47. 
Saga 
Marriott 
S 
B 
48. 
Sanders 
Associates 
Lockheedd 
S 
49. 
SCM 
Hanson 
Trust 
B 
-> 
S 
50. 
Scovill 
First 
City 
Properties 
B 
51. 
Southland 
Royalty 
Burlington 
Northern 
S 
Maybe 
52. 
Sperry 
Burroughs 
S 
B 
53. 
Strawbridge 
& 
Clothier 
Berry' 
54. 
Tull 
Industries 
Bethlehem 
Steeld 
S 
NOLs 
55. 
Unidynamics 
Craned 
56. 
Union 
Carbide 
GAFf 
B 
W, 
P 
57. 
Uniroyale 
Clayton-Dubilierd 
B 
B, 
W 
58. 
Unocal 
Mesa 
Partnersf 
Partn 
Yes 
59. 
U.S. 
Industries 
Hanson 
Trust 
60. 
Van 
Dusen 
Air 
APL 
Partnership 
B 
-> 
S 
Partn 
61. 
Westchester 
Financial 
Services 
Marine 
Midland 
Bankd 
S 
62. 
White 
Consolidated 
Electrolux 
S 
Total 
34 
17 
(10) 
14 
19 
9 
Source: 
See 
table 
1. 
a. 
B: 
at 
least 
50 
percent 
of 
the 
acquisition 
price 
was 
recouped 
through 
selloffs. 
B 
S: 
bustup 
where 
significant 
selloffs 
are 
to 
strategic 
buyers. 
b. 
P: 
significant 
pension 
plan 
withdrawals. 
W: 
white-collar 
layoffs 
can 
explain 
over 
25 
percent 
of 
the 
premium 
(computed 
at 
halfpoint 
between 
five 
years 
and 
perpetuity). 
B: 
blue-collar 
layoffs 
can 
explain 
over 
25 
percent 
of 
the 
premium 
(computed 
at 
halfpoint 
between 
five 
years 
and 
perpetuity). 
c. 
NOLs: 
net 
operating 
losses 
can 
explain 
over 
15 
percent 
of 
the 
premium. 
Debt: 
tax 
savings 
from 
debt 
tax 
shield 
can 
explain 
over 
25 
percent 
of 
the 
premium. 
Partn: 
tax 
savings 
from 
conversion 
of 
target 
into 
a 
partnership. 
d. 
White 
knight. 
e. 
LBO. 
f. 
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Table 10. Movement of Assetsa 
Millions 
Movement  of dollars  Percent 
Assets that  changed  hands  68,743  100 
Assets that  went to strategic  buyers  49,660  72 
Strategic  acquisitions  net of selloffs  26,010  38 
Selloffs to strategic  buyers  23,650  34 
Assets that  went to MBOs  10,234  15 
Direct  MBOs net of selloffs  4,834  7 
Selloffs to MBOs  5,400  8 
Assets that  stayed  with initial  nonstrategic 
bidders  3,810  5.5 
Assets that  went to unrelated  acquisitions  3,154  4.5 
Direct  unrelated  bidders  373  0.5 
Selloffs to unrelated  bidders  2,781  4 
Selloffs of headquarters  and other  assets  667  1 
Unidentified  selloffs  1,219  2 
Source: See table 1. 
a.  Total value of offers in the sample is $108.5 billion. The value of assets that did not change hands was $39.7 billion. 
buying other firms in the same or a closely  related industry. In the cases 
where the initial acquirer did not want the majority of the assets of the 
target company  but only  some  divisions,  we  see  a combination  of  a 
strategic acquisition  and a bustup.  (In these cases,  there is an S in the 
first column  and a B  in the second  column  of  the table.)  Thus many 
apparent bustups turn out to be strategic in nature as well. 
The first column of table 9 does not capture the full extent of strategic 
acquisitions.  It does  not consider  the bustups that resulted in the sale 
of a significant fraction of the assets to other strategic buyers when the 
original  acquirer was  not  strategically  motivated.  This  adds another 
seven cases to the list of ultimately strategic transactions. Most of these 
are cases  of  takeover  artists buying  diversified  firms and then selling 
off  the pieces  to strategic buyers. 
When we add the number of strategic acquisitions  to the number of 
nonstrategic  acquisitions  where  the  selloffs  were  largely  to  strategic 
buyers,  we  end  up with  41  cases  out of  the total 62,  or 66  percent. 
These results are confirmed by value-weighted  evidence  in table 10 on 
who  the  eventual  holders  of  the  assets  in our sample  are.  The  total 
value  of offers  in our sample is $108  billion. Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  49 
Of  this  value  of  assets,  $39  billion  did  not change  hands.  These 
assets were initially  owned  by targets that remained independent,  and 
were not sold off by these targets. The remaining $69 billion  of assets 
changed hands,  and the question  is where they ended up. 
As  we  see  it,  the assets  could  go  to  strategic buyers,  to unrelated 
buyers,  to MBOs or investment  firms, to nonstrategic initial acquirers 
other than MBOs, to buyers of headquarters and other marketable assets 
in selloffs,  and to unspecified  buyers in selloffs.  An asset can end up 
with a strategic buyer either if it is bought initially by a strategic buyer 
and then not sold off or if it is sold off by anyone to a strategic buyer. 
Similarly,  there are two ways to end up owned by an MBO or held by 
an unrelated buyer: by being retained or by being acquired in a selloff. 
As table  10 shows,  of the $69 billion  of assets that changed hands, 
72  percent  ended  up  in  the  possession  of  strategic  buyers.  That 72 
percent consisted  of  38  percent that was  retained by  initial  strategic 
buyers and 34  percent that was  sold off  to strategic buyers.  By  com- 
parison,  only  15 percent of assets ended up with MBOs or investment 
companies,  4.5  percent ended up with unrelated acquirers, 5.5  percent 
stayed with initial  nonstrategic buyers,  2 percent went to unidentified 
buyers in selloffs,  and 1 percent went to buyers of sold-off headquarters 
and other marketable assets. 
The results again demonstrate the overwhelming  importance of stra- 
tegic  acquisitions  in this sample.  If we  assume,  not implausibly,  that 
the assets  that ended up with MBOs or investment companies  as well 
as the assets  that were retained by nonstrategic buyers were managed 
by a new organizational  form rather than by a corporation, we end up 
with  20.5  percent of  all the assets  that changed  hands.  That share is 
only  28  percent of  the assets  that went to strategic buyers.  It is very 
clear that a movement  to a new organizational form, where incentives 
are crucial,  is  not the  steady  state of  most  assets  acquired in hostile 
takeovers.  Rather, the steady state of an asset is being owned by a large 
public corporation in the same line of business as that asset. The primary 
motive  behind hostile  takeovers  is not a change  in incentives  but an 
increase  in the concentration  of  asset holdings. 
The predominance of this allocation of resources suggests a relatively 
small role for incentive-intensive  organizational forms, except perhaps 
for the purposes of implementing selloffs.  It also suggests that unrelated 
acquisitions  have become  rare. There are only a few cases of unrelated 50  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1990 
diversification  by buyers  of  divisions  in this  sample:  Ralston  Purina 
buying Eveready Batteries from Union Carbide, a British conglomerate 
buying  Yale  Lock  from  Scovill.  There  are also  two  cases  of  initial 
unrelated  acquisitions,  although  in  both  cases  the  acquisitions  are 
vaguely  related. The time of unrelated diversification seems to be past. 
The  idea  is rather to bust up the conglomerates  that have previously 
pursued unrelated diversification  and to allocate  divisions  to strategic 
buyers.  In fact,  Bhide finds in his sample of post-takeover divestitures 
that only 3 out of 81 were companies divesting,  directly through selloffs, 
a business  they  started; the rest were cases  of divesting  past acquisi- 
tions  32 
This  evidence  raises  the  obvious  question  of  where  the  gains  in 
strategic acquisitions  come from.  In some cases,  they may come from 
increases  in market power.  This,  for example,  seems quite possible  in 
consolidation  of  pipelines  following  deregulation  (American  Natural 
Resources  and Coastal,  Midcon  and Occidental  Petroleum).  Quaker 
Oats' acquisition  of Anderson Clayton to keep Gaines dogfood  was an 
explicit  move to raise market share, although the link from market share 
to market power  is not always  evident.  Minstar's  acquisition  of  boat 
divisions  of several companies  also gave it a significant market share. 
Mergers of paper companies  probably do not increase competition  ei- 
ther.  Many  selloffs  also  raise  concentration.  KKR's  selloff  of  some 
stores  of  Safeway  was  to buyers  who  already had significant  market 
shares in the areas where the acquired stores operated. In these cases, 
declines  in competition  are potentially  important. 
Cost  savings  due  to joint  economies  in management,  production, 
distribution,  and purchasing are also  obviously  important in strategic 
acquisitions.  The classic  example  is the Burroughs takeover of Sperry 
that resulted in significant economies  accompanied by massive layoffs. 
Some of the better deals negotiated with the suppliers and some of the 
gains from layoffs  probably reflected wealth transfers rather than pure 
efficiency  improvements.  Significant cost savings were realized in Ster- 
ling Software's  acquisition of Informatics as well.  Some of the mergers 
we  mentioned  in  discussing  market power  probably also  led to  cost 
cuts.  These  cuts  might be another source  of gains  in strategic acqui- 
32.  Bhide (1989). Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  51 
sitions,  which  may represent an efficiency  gain rather than a transfer 
from consumers. 
Last but not least,  many strategic acquisitions  result in declines  in 
the value of acquiring firms, indicating the market's skepticism that the 
bid serves  the interest of  shareholders rather than the managers.  We 
have presented some evidence  on bidder value declines,  although these 
numbers are subject to considerable  error in estimation.  The increase 
in combined values of bidders and targets in strategic acquisitions means 
either that large joint  profit gains that we do not measure are realized 
or that the stock market in the 1980s,  like the stock market in the 1960s, 
was excessively  bullish  on takeovers. 
Bustups 
In  17 of  62  cases,  or about a quarter of  the total,  proceeds  from 
selloffs  amounted to at least 50 percent of the purchase price.  In about 
half the 62 cases,  the bustup was a side effect  of a bidder's buying the 
whole  company  and keeping  only  the part that was  wanted.  Another 
significant fraction of bustups was engineered by raiders-for  example, 
James Goldsmith-who  specialize  in selling  the parts to strategic buy- 
ers. Bustups also occured after MBOs. After Clayton-Dubilier's  selloffs 
at Uniroyal,  the only retained division  was tires, and even that division 
was eventually  sold to a tire company.  By and large,  then, bustups fit 
very closely  into the picture of strategic acquisitions.  Either the original 
buyer in a hostile  takeover keeps  the parts it wants,  often  selling  the 
others to strategic buyers as well; or the company is broken up and sold 
off  largely  to strategic buyers.  In fact,  48 percent of assets that ended 
up with strategic buyers did so as a result of a selloff  rather than of the 
original acquisition.  The willingness  of strategic buyers to pay a lot for 
these  assets  must be an important source of gains in bustups. 
Layoffs 
Table 9 marks 14 cases  in which  layoffs  (or pension  terminations) 
can explain  at least  25  percent of  the premium using  the midpoint of 
the five-year  and the perpetuity cost  saving  estimates.  In 8 cases,  the 
laid-off  employees  were  only  white-collar,  in 3 cases  they were only 
blue-collar,  in  2  cases  they  were  both,  and in  2  cases  pension  plan 
terminations  can account  for a large chunk of  the premium.  Savings 52  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1990 
from white-collar  employment  cuts can account for a larger fraction of 
the premium. 
White-collar  employment  cuts typically  resulted from headquarters 
consolidations,  although in a few  cases  (Union  Carbide, Allied)  there 
were massive white-collar layoffs.  Even in the cases where headquarters 
reductions led to large cost savings,  the takeovers were primarily stra- 
tegic  and would probably have occurred even if such savings were not 
possible.  In only  one  case  (Owens  Corning Fiberglass),  layoffs  were 
of  R&D  staff,  and it is  sometimes  argued that R&D expenditures  in 
this company  were  excessively  high.  Treating layoffs  as the primary 
motive  for takeovers  appears to be inappropriate, although they often 
are a significant  source of gains. 
Taxes 
The source of  gains  that we have not so far treated systematically, 
but that we  still  believe  to be  important,  is  taxes.  Table  9  notes  19 
cases  in which  tax gains  can probably account for at least 25 percent 
of the premium offered.  Of these, 4 are cases in which the target became 
a partnership,  3 are cases  of bidders with tax losses,  and the rest are 
cases  of  large-debt  tax  shields.  Of the  12 cases  with  significant  debt 
tax shields,  6 are cases  of  successful  takeovers by large corporations 
(all but  1 are clearly  strategic)  rather than leveraged  recapitalizations 
by firms remaining independent or of LBOs. 
In many cases  in which a large debt was incurred in the acquisition, 
the firm proceeded  to  make large  selloffs  and pay back most of  that 
debt. Since  the value of the tax shield is limited by the duration of the 
debt,  we  try to get an estimate  of how quickly  the debt is paid down. 
We calculate  the change  in debt based on the firm's debt level  two to 
three years after the acquisition for the purposes of the debt tax shields 
calculation.  We  take the  present  value  of  the tax benefits  to  be  0.2 
times  the additional  debt.  The 0.2  multiplier is consistent  with either 
some  Miller-type  personal tax effects  lessening  the net tax advantage 
to debt or with gradual repayment of the debt over seven to ten years. 
We  also  had no handle on other tax benefits,  such as accelerated  de- 
preciation under the general utilities doctrine. These issues require con- 
siderable  further investigation.  Our conjecture  is  that tax  gains  will 
prove to be somewhat  important-probably  about as important as lay- 
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the combined  value  of  the bidder and the target in some  strategic ac- 
quisitions  with few  measured post-takeover  changes. 
Investment  Cuts 
Our analysis  of  investment  cuts is  severely  limited  by the scarcity 
of target-specific  data. Table 9 marks nine cases  in which  investment 
cuts might be important. We note a few  things about each of them. 
In three cases the cuts were in the petroleum industry (Unocal,  Phil- 
lips,  and Southland  Royalty)  during the time of  declining  oil  prices. 
These cases fit nicely Jensen's free cash flow theory, according to which 
oil companies  continued to explore even when value maximization dic- 
tated a significant curtailment of exploration activities.  Hostile takeover 
threats enforced  this reduction in exploration  (as well  as adoption of 
limited partnership organizational  form to save taxes).  Although firms 
that were not targets of hostile takeovers also cut back exploration, they 
might  have  done  it under the threat of  takeover.  The free  cash  flow 
story seems  very plausible  for oil. 
Another industry in which  severe  investment cuts took place  in the 
period of  declining  oil  prices  was  gas pipelines,  presumably because 
gas is a substitute for oil and its price falls when oil prices fall.  If it is 
rational to curtail investment when the gas price declines,  the observed 
cuts must be rational.  In the case  of  gas pipelines,  we do not believe 
the free cash flow story explains  the takeovers.  During this period the 
industry experienced  deregulation  and consolidation,  with  the effect 
that there were many mergers assembling  pipeline  systems  to increase 
reliability  of  supplies  as well  as market power.  There is virtually no 
public  discussion  of  the  objective  of  pipeline  mergers being  to  stop 
investment  rather than to create pipeline  systems.  Our view  also  fits 
with the mass of often successful  antitrust suits following  these mergers. 
The investment  cuts after the takeovers thus do not seem to be driving 
these  takeovers  in the first place  or even  to be a by-product of  these 
takeovers. 
The  third group  of  takeovers  with  investment  cuts-or  rather in- 
creases in disinvestment-is  in timber. Most notable of these is Maxxam's 
takeover  of  Pacific  Lumber,  but there  is  also  Amalgamated  Sugar's 
takeover of Medford. In these two cases,  the cutting of trees was sharply 
increased.  The targets were apparently cutting too few trees given  the 
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Lumber, in particular, had a huge forest of old redwoods that were not 
growing.  The company  was nonetheless  not cutting them despite high 
interest rates, perhaps because  it expected  a secular rise in the price of 
old redwoods.  Maxxam came in and cut the trees. Assuming  away the 
possibility  of disagreement over the future prices of these trees (market 
underpricing),  we  have  a case  in  which  cutting  the trees raises  effi- 
ciency.  The Medford story is similar. This is not really a free cash flow 
case,  since there was no cash that the target reinvested wastefully,  but 
it is nonetheless  a case  in which  disinvestment  and partial liquidation 
were enforced  by a takeover. 
The  final  two  cases  are an LBO  and a leveraged  recapitalization 
where investment  was  cut and the debt raised very sharply (National 
Gypsum and Owens Corning).  These may be free cash flow cases,  but 
they may also be cases  of cuts in useful  investment because of limited 
access  to capital.  In both cases,  much of the takeover premium can be 
explained  with the debt tax shield,  and in the case of Owens  Corning 
there were  large white-collar  layoffs  also.  In a similar vein,  Kaplan 
finds large investment  reductions following  MBOs more generally.33 
In sum, the evidence  on the free cash flow theory is mixed.  It appears 
relevant in the case of oil. It might be relevant in the case of gas pipelines 
and in  the  case  of  LBOs,  although  the  evidence  is  not  compelling, 
especially  with pipelines.  In the case of timber, an amended version of 
the free cash flow theory might apply as well,  although there is no free 
cash flow.  Investment cuts are thus potentially  important in 9 cases out 
of  62.  In  most  other  cases,  particularly  with  strategic  acquisitions, 
investment  cuts are either ignored in all the discussions  and reports we 
found,  or else  are not there. However,  we do not think it is likely  that 
lack of reporting is the whole story, since in the case of the oil industry, 
reports of investment cuts are very common.  The conspicuous  absence 
of  such  discussions  for  most  other industries  might  indicate  that in- 
vestment  cuts are simply  unimportant. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Although  we  do  not have  the  final answer on  what drives  hostile 
takeovers,  several  conclusions  do emerge from the analysis. 
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First,  hostile  takeovers  largely  allocate  businesses  to firms owning 
other related businesses.  Firms acquire related firms both directly  in 
the takeover  and in selloffs  after the takeover.  Of the $69  billion  in 
assets  that changed  hands in our sample,  72  percent ended up in the 
hands of firms managing other similar assets.  We do not know whether 
the gains in related acquisitions  come from improvements in operating 
efficiency,  increases  in market power,  or other sources. 
Second,  by  comparison  with  strategic  reallocation  of  assets,  re- 
allocation  to MBO teams,  investment  groups,  raiders, or other incen- 
tive-intensive  organizations is only 20 percent of the total that changed 
hands. Raiders and MBO teams appear largely to serve the temporary 
function  of  brokering the transfer of  assets  toward related acquirers. 
High debt levels  and concentrated ownership give  these organizations 
a strong incentive  to implement  a bustup,  but the task of  subsequent 
management is left to others. 
Third, layoffs  are an important but not a dominant source of hostile 
takeover gains,  accounting  perhaps for 11 percent to 26 percent of the 
premium on average.  Layoffs  are disproportionately targeted at white- 
collar employees,  many of them in the course of consolidation  of head- 
quarters. 
Fourth,  selloffs  are a pervasive  consequence  of  hostile  takeovers, 
and in many cases  result in a liquidation  or a near-liquidation of  the 
target. A key objective  of selloffs  is to foster related acquisitions: over 
two thirds of the selloffs  are to firms in a related business.  Selloffs  are 
smallest  when the acquirer is a white knight. 
Fifth, tax savings are important in some cases,  particularly in LBOs, 
but the benefits of the debt tax shield  are significantly  reduced by the 
rapid repayment of debt. Tax losses  and conversion  to partnerships are 
less  common  but provide large benefits when they do take place. 
Sixth,  among the explanations  of the sources of takeover gains that 
are important in some, but relatively few,  cases are bidding shareholder 
losses  and cuts  of  wasteful  investment  by  the target firm. These  are 
much less  common  sources  of gains than layoffs  or tax savings. 
These  findings suggest  the following  picture of the hostile  takeover 
process  of  the  1980s.  In the postwar period,  aggressive  antitrust en- 
forcement prevented significant consolidation  of U.S.  industry and per- 
haps even  encouraged  the  formation  of  conglomerates  in the  1960s. 
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the most  profitable way  to run businesses.34  The failure of  conglom- 
erates is revealed by the finding of Porter and of Kaplan and Weisbach 
that 40 percent to 60 percent of unrelated acquisitions were subsequently 
divested.35 
In the 1  980s,  the economy has again experienced a corporate liquidity 
boom.  This  increased  liquidity  has  come  in two  forms.  The  first is 
greater internally generated cash flows  in large corporations that want 
to  make  related  (strategic)  acquisitions.  The  second  is  a  newfound 
ability  to  issue  speculative-grade  ("junk")  bonds  as a temporary fi- 
nancing  tool  while  assets  are being  sold  off.  Junk bonds  facilitated 
acquisitions by so-called  "raiders"  as well as by some strategic buyers. 
In addition,  the most lenient antitrust enforcement  in decades  allowed 
the large pent-up demand for related acquisitions to be satisfied. Finally, 
heightened  foreign  competition  and the  deregulation  of  several  key 
industries  such  as transportation, banking,  and oil  and gas  increased 
the gains  from intraindustry mergers.  The takeover wave  became  the 
wave  of  related  acquisitions.  Much  of  this  wave  is  reflected  in  the 
increased pace of friendly related acquisitions.  But in addition, the pace 
of hostile takeovers skyrocketed.  Many of the hostile takeovers, as well 
as acquisitions  by white  knights,  aimed to deconglomerate  large cor- 
porations  and to  allocate  their various  divisions  to related acquirers. 
Raiders  and MBO  organizers  in particular acquired diversified  firms 
and sold  off  the parts to related acquirers, profiting handsomely  from 
performing this brokerage function. 
Although  the expansion  into related businesses  drove the takeover 
process,  several opportunities to raise the value of firms must have also 
encouraged hostile takeovers.  The opportunities to cut overhead during 
consolidations  by cutting headquarters staff as well  as some  common 
functions  allowed  nontrivial cost savings that certainly helped the pro- 
cess,  although they did not drive it. Tax subsidies to debt clearly helped 
the raiders and MBO  organizers  to realize  some  gains,  although  the 
opportunity  to  unload  the  assets  on  strategic buyers  must have  been 
crucial. The fact that the typically  strategically motivated white knights 
reap fewer gains from layoffs and selloffs  than hostile acquirers suggests 
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that these  changes  are  not  the  most  essential  source  of  gains  from 
consolidation. 
Our evidence  also  shows  what hostile  takeovers  are not.  They  are 
not typically  a reflection  of change  in the internal organization of the 
firm. Management buyouts and acquisitions  by raiders are often a tem- 
porary step in the reallocation  of assets; they are not a new permanent 
organizational  form.  The  eventual  holders  of  assets  are large  public 
corporations,  which  are not about to be eclipsed. 
This interpretation of  hostile  takeovers  in the  1980s  offers  several 
tentative conclusions  for policy analysis.  First, hostile takeovers do not 
result in massive  employment  cuts in acquired companies.  State anti- 
takeover laws that aim to stop takeovers to protect blue-collar workers 
are misguided.  Since such laws probably stop some takeovers that foster 
specialization  of corporations,  they are more likely  than not to reduce 
efficiency.  Second,  Reagan's lenient antitrust enforcement of the 1980s 
indirectly  fostered  deconglomeration  of  the U.S.  economy.  Since  the 
experience  with conglomerates  seems almost uniformly disappointing, 
the move  toward specialization  probably on balance raises efficiency. 
In some  cases,  competition  is probably reduced,  but our case  studies 
suggest  that there are many business  reasons  for related acquisitions 
other than to raise  prices.  Unfortunately,  we  do not have  the highly 
disaggregated market share data necessary to evaluate the precise scope 
for increased market power in our sample of acquisitions.  On balance, 
however,  the evidence  suggests  to us that the Reagan antitrust stance 
has had a positive  influence  on the economy. 
Our analysis  leaves  open the key question: where do the value gains 
in strategic acquisitions  come from? The fact that in a typical strategic 
acquisition the combined wealth change of the bidding and target share- 
holders  is  positive  suggests  that the  market believes  these  gains  do 
exist.  We have identified some sources of efficiency  improvements and 
other gains,  such  as  headquarters layoffs  and tax  savings,  but they 
clearly are not the whole  story. There may be many efficiency  gains in 
production, procurement, and distribution that we have no way of cap- 
turing. Gains from market power might also be relevant,  but the evi- 
dence on the existence  of these gains is inconclusive.  Finally,  the value 
gains recorded may simply  reflect the market's overestimation  of  the 
value  of  strategic combinations,  just  as the market overestimated  the 
gains  to  conglomerate  mergers  in  the  1960s.  This  may  be  reflected 58  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
either in too low a share price for the pre-takeover target firm or in too 
high  a price  for the  post-takeover  acquirer or those  buying  divested 
divisions  of the target at high prices.  In part, the market may currently 
be underpricing conglomerates  relative to undiversified companies.  All 
of the above  sources  of gains are potentially  important. We appear to 
have reduced the scope  of the problem to that of related acquisitions, 
but that problem remains wide  open. 
Appendix: Brief Summaries of Deals 
In this appendix,  we present a brief summary of what we believe  to 
be important sources of target shareholder wealth gains in each one of 
our 62  hostile  takeover  attempts.  We bring in the earlier evidence  on 
bidding  shareholder wealth  changes,  layoffs,  and selloffs  when  such 
evidence  is pertinent, but also discuss  taxes,  investment changes,  and 
possible  stock market underpricing when we believe  these  are impor- 
tant. In addition, we document the cases where strategic motives appear 
to play  a role,  that is,  how  often  the bidder and the target are in the 
same  or in  closely  related  businesses.  Equity  refers to  the  purchase 
price of  equity,  debt to the pre-takeover  value  of debt,  and premium 
to the premium computed in the text. 
1.  Minstar  buys Aegis.  Equity $59  million;  debt $20  million;  pre- 
mium $22 million.  Selloff  of Cherco Compressors and Turboscope,  the 
latter bought  as part of  AMF,  for $150  million,  but don't  know  how 
much is from Aegis.  Some operations discontinued,  but no clear layoffs. 
$3 million  taken from the pension  fund. $53 million  in additional debt 
is taken on by Minstar so taxes may play a role.  Primarily, this seems 
to be a strategic  acquisition.  Minstar makes boats and is interested in 
the boat division  of Aegis. 
2.  Prime Motor Inn buys American Motor Inn. Equity $238 million; 
debt $67 million; premium $60 million.  Selloffs  of $383.7  million,  with 
12 Holiday Inns retained. Over half of selloffs  are to limited partnerships 
with  Prime leasing  some  of  them back.  There was  an increase  in in- 
vestment (refurbishing). No layoffs.  This is partly a strategic acquisition 
with  Prime now  managing  many of  the former AMI properties.  It is Sanjai  Bhagat, Andrei  Shleifer,  and Robert  Vishny  59 
also a bustup, motivated largely by the tax benefits of the limited part- 
nership form of organization  (only  one layer of tax). 
3.  Campeau buys Allied Stores.  Equity $3.7  billion; debt $664  mil- 
lion; premium $1. 11 billion.  Selloffs  of at least $2.5 billion.  Remaining 
divisions  generate  about  50  percent  of  revenue.  Assumes  about  $3 
billion  in additional debt but with very rapid payback through selloffs. 
Layoffs  of at least 2,625:  600 headquarters, 2,025  blue-collar;  savings 
of between  $270  million  and $705 million  in present-value terms. This 
appears to be a strategic bid for Allied's  shopping  centers  (Campeau 
is  a  shopping  center  developer),  but the  premium may  derive  from 
profitable asset  selloffs  and savings  from layoffs. 
4.  Coastal  buys American Natural Resources.  Equity $2.46  billion; 
debt $1,065  billion; premium $763 million.  No selloffs.  Assumes  $1.9 
billion in additional debt with fairly slow pay down. Some job reduction 
and  a  sharp decrease  in  investment,  but this  is  true throughout the 
industry.  Appears to be a strategic bid stemming  from the post-dere- 
gulation  consolidation  in the pipeline  industry.  The market seems  to 
like  Coastal's  strategy; its market value  rose by $117  million  around 
the announcement  of  its bid. 
5.  Minstar buys AMF. Equity $545 million; debt $170 million; pre- 
mium $74  million.  Selloffs  of at least $511  million  (although Minstar 
CEO Jacobs says $535  million).  Retained several AMF businesses  ac- 
counting for approximately 20-25  percent of pre-acquisition operating 
profit and $350 million  in book value.  In particular, kept boat division, 
Hatteras,  which  fits into Jacobs'  strategy of  acquiring boat manufac- 
turers. Cut 350  staff  positions  with  present value  of  saving  between 
$67 million  and $175  million.  Strategic bid for part of company com- 
bined  with  a  profitable  bustup  and  large  savings  from  headquarters 
layoffs. 
6.  Quaker Oats  buys Anderson  Clayton  as  a  white knight.  Equity 
$805 million; debt $19 million; premium $108 million.  Sells off all but 
Gaines dogfood  for $535  million.  Anderson Clayton had $240  million 
in cash.  This  means  $50  million  for Gaines.  Previously  offered  $250 
million  for Gaines  alone.  Headquarters staff  reduction  with  present- 
value  of  savings  of  at  least  $145  million.  Strategic  bid  for  part of 
company,  combined  with  a very  profitable bustup and headquarters 
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acquisition is announced, suggesting  that market did not anticipate such 
a profitable bustup. 
7.  Wesray buys Atlas  Van Lines in a white knight LBO. Equity $72 
million; debt $4.6  million; premium $27 million.  Assumed $70 million 
additional debt.  No  selloffs.  Evidence  that employment  declines  from 
over 600  to 524  over two  years,  but no mention  of  layoffs.  Debt tax 
shield  can explain  most of the premium. 
8.  Walton Monroe  Mills  buys Avondale  Mills  as  a  white  knight. 
Equity $1 13 million; debt $37.6  million; premium $38 million.  Intended 
selloffs  of  about  $18  million.  No  layoffs,  but information  is  scarce 
because the acquirer is private. $4.5  million from pension fund. Largely 
a strategic  acquisition;  Avondale  is the exclusive  marketer of Walton 
Monroe products and also buys a large quantity for its own account. 
9.  The Limited unsuccessfully tries to buy Carter Hawley Hale (1984). 
Equity $1. 1 billion; debt $521 million; premium $397.  Selloffs  of $333 
million.  No evidence  of layoffs.  Appears to be a strategically motivated 
acquisition  attempt possibly  with bustup elements. 
10.  Retail  Partners  (including  the Limited)  unsuccessfully  tries  to 
buy Carter Hawley Hale  (1986).  Equity $1.95  billion;  debt $700  mil- 
lion; premium $1.16  billion.  Selloffs  of  $213  million.  However,  also 
spin off  most valuable  properties to shareholders,  including  Neiman- 
Marcus,  Bergdorf-Goodman,  Contempo Casuals.  No evidence  of lay- 
offs.  Again,  seems  to be strategic,  with elements  of a bustup. 
11.  Turner Broadcasting  tries  unsuccessfully  to buy CBS.  Equity 
$5.41  billion;  debt  $371  million;  premium  $2.75  billion.  Defensive 
response by CBS is a leveraged recapitalization with selloffs  of at least 
$3.44  billion,  but the most valuable assets remain. Partly these selloffs 
are profitable because  of a rise in the market as a whole  over the two 
years following  the Turner bid.  Present value of  savings  from layoffs 
between  $238  million  and $627  million.  Capital expenditures  in the 
broadcast division  are cut by $30 million.  This appears to have been a 
strategic bid by Turner for part of the company (broadcasting),  but the 
bid may have  also  been  motivated  by gains  from bustup and layoffs. 
Seems  to have elements  of everything. 
12.  Unilever  buys  Chesebrough-Ponds  as  a  white  knight.  Equity 
$3.1  billion;  debt $1.17  billion;  premium $1.44  billion.  Selloffs  are 
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bought shortly prior to being itself acquired. Layoffs  save between $30 
million  and $80  million  in present value  terms.  Strategic bid for the 
core business,  which is personal hygiene and health care products. This 
fits with  Unilever's  strategic  objective  to gain a larger U.S.  presence 
in these products for purposes of exploiting  its superior R&D. 
13.  Westpoint Pepperell  buys  Cluett  Peabody  as  a  white  knight. 
Equity $375  million;  debt $124 million; premium $77 million.  No lay- 
offs.  No  selloffs.  West  Point assumes  approximately  $125  million  in 
additional debt,  which  it does  not pay down quickly.  Appears to be a 
strategic acquisition  motivated  by Westpoint's  desire to acquire more 
brand names including  several  international brands of Cluett. 
14.  James Goldsmith buys Crown Zellerbach (no white knight  found). 
Equity around $1.2  billion;  debt $648  million; premium $193  million. 
Selloffs  of at least $1.15  billion,  mostly to strategic buyers. Goldsmith 
is after Crown Zellerbach timberland, which he considers undervalued. 
This is clearly a bustup, possibly  with elements  of underpricing by the 
stock  market of  timber assets  or too  slow  harvesting by Crown as in 
the Pacific  Lumber case  (see  below). 
15.  Equity Group buys Easco.  Equity $175 million; debt $90 million; 
premium $27 million.  Selloffs  of $13 million.  Acquirer is interested in 
the hand tool business  of Easco as evidenced  by its buying  100 percent 
of this business  from remaining shareholders of Easco.  Hand tool busi- 
ness  is  in the midst of  dramatic turnaround clearly  started before  the 
bid (but not finished  until after).  There is a reduction of employment 
from 3,065  to 2,184  with a large rise in sales  per employee.  At least 
350  of  these  881  layoffs  take place  before  the bid,  and the manager 
brought in to lead the turnaround is kept on by the acquirer. Layoffs 
of this magnitude can easily  explain the premium paid. The only ques- 
tion is whether the acquisition  was needed to speed up the turnaround 
or whether the acquirer was simply more willing  than the market to bet 
on the results.  Easco  Hand Tools  goes  public again in 1987. 
16.  Revlon buys Frigitronics  after a failed  LBO.  Equity $115  mil- 
lion; debt $8 million;  premium $41  million.  Asset  selloffs  of  at least 
$120 million,  largely to strategic buyers. No layoffs.  Complete bustup 
and liquidation-both  planned from the start. 
17.  People Express buys Frontier Holdings as a white knight. Equity 
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agreement  with  People's.  No  asset  selloffs  until bankruptcy.  People 
tries to turn Frontier into  a no-frills  airline but the strategy does  not 
work out as Frontier is badly hurt by fare wars in its major markets. 
After that, People  tries to sell Frontier to United for $146  million,  but 
fails.  Instead, United buys hangars, gates,  etc.,  for $50 million.  Even- 
tually bought by Texas  Air for $174  million,  including  assumption of 
debt.  Initial  acquisition  is  clearly  strategic.  Part of  People's  ill-fated 
expansion  program. 
18.  Fruehauf LBO as defense against Edelman. Equity $ 1.1 billion; 
debt  $480  million;  premium  $414  million.  Selloffs  of  at least  $732 
million,  but kept automotive  business  and domestic  truck trailers di- 
visions  representing over 80 percent of pre-acquisition operating profit. 
Close  to bankruptcy soon  after the buyout.  Assumed  $500  million  in 
additional long-term debt and $400 million-$500  million  in additional 
short-term debt at time of buyout.  After  1.5 years had $400  million  of 
the additional long-term debt remaining. Layoffs of 730 to save between 
$55  million  and $146  million  in present-value  terms. Basically,  man- 
agement forced into bustup/restructuring LBO,  but probably overpay- 
ment by the LBO group combined  with industry shocks  to the trailer 
and container businesses. 
19.  Revlon unsuccessfully  tries to buy Gillette.  Equity $4.12  billion; 
debt  $436  million;  premium  $1.48  billion.  Selloffs  of  $50  million. 
Planned layoffs  will  save  between  $182  million  and $480  million  in 
present-value terms. The bidder probably intended a much more radical 
bustup and restructuring than actually  occurred as evidenced  by  low 
level  of Gillette's  share price after fending  off  Revlon. 
20.  Itel  Corporation  buys Great Lakes International.  Equity $170 
million; debt $30 million; premium $14 million.  Selloffs  of $31 million. 
Itel has large tax loss carryforwards, and Great Lakes is showing profit. 
Also,  Itel may be betting on legislation  passed shortly after acquisition, 
which is a huge boon to Great Lakes' offshore dredging business.  Small 
premium can easily  be explained  by taxes. 
21.  Mark IV Industries  buys Gulton.  Equity $113  million;  debt $9 
million;  premium $36  million.  Insubstantial selloffs.  Appears to take 
on approximately  $100  million  in additional long-term debt,  which  is 
not paid down quickly,  although it is difficult to attribute all that debt 
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numbers. Mark IV assembles  a diversified portfolio of small high-tech 
businesses  in various  industries  and simply  reallocates  capital among 
them.  Mark IV market value declines  by $6 million  on announcement 
of bid. 
22.  International  Paper  buys Hammermill Paper as a white knight. 
Equity $1.1  billion;  debt $310  million;  premium $418  million.  Small 
selloffs.  No  layoffs.  Strategic. 
23.  Kroger buys Hook Drugs as a white knight. Equity $161 million; 
debt $13  million;  premium $74  million.  No  selloffs  initially.  Hook is 
supposed  to be well  run. Subsequently  Kroger sells  off  Hook  and its 
own drug chain,  Superex,  to management team for $490  million.  Not 
clear how much is Hook,  but conjectured $100  million-$200  million. 
Kroger is said to lose a little on Hook overall.  Initial intention is clearly 
strategic;  alleged  synergies  in pharmaceutical purchasing and private 
label procurement. Does  not appear to have worked out. Kroger's mar- 
ket value falls  by $26  million  on announcement of  its bid. 
24.  Coastal tries unsuccessfully  to buy Houston Natural Gas. Equity 
$2.72  billion;  debt  $360  million;  premium  $961  million.  Defensive 
response by HNG is leveraged recapitalization/share buyback plan. In- 
itially,  $700  million  in additional  debt is  assumed.  Selloffs  of  more 
than $544  million.  No evidence  of layoffs  at this stage.  HNG acquires 
two additional pipelines  in 1984.  Strategic bid 'a  la Coastal/ANR; post- 
deregulation consolidation  in pipeline industry. Within two years, HNG 
is acquired by Internorth in a friendly  acquisition. 
25.  Gulf Resources  unsuccessfully  tries to buy Imperial Continental 
Gas (a British Company).  Equity 753 million  pounds; some debt; pre- 
mium 155 million  pounds.  Defensive  response of IC Gas is to be split 
into two companies,  the first containing the firm's sought after Belgian 
assets.  After spinoff  the Belgian  assets were acquired for 448  million 
pounds. The second piece  of IC Gas later rejects a bid for 821 million 
pounds,  but then spins off  a subsidiary valued at 300 million  pounds. 
A clear attempted bustup. 
26.  Sterling  Software  buys Informatics  General.  Equity $126  mil- 
lion;  debt  $1  million;  premium  28  million.  Selloffs  of  at least  $34 
million.  Sterling assumes  $100  million  in additional debt.  Initial goal 
is to reduce debt to $50  million,  but two  years later only  reduced by 
$20-30  million.  Eliminate  entire corporate staff (60  domestic  and 50 64  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
international employees).  Present value of the after-tax savings is $22- 
60 million.  Layoffs  suffice  to explain  most of the premium,  although 
debt tax shields  may explain a large part of the premium. Also,  this is 
clearly  a strategic  acquisition. 
27.  Reliance  Capital buys John Blair as a white knight. Equity $356 
million;  debt  $240  million;  premium  $165  million.  Selloffs  at least 
$377  million.  Keep  Spanish  TV  stations  that Reliance  also  has.  No 
evidence  of layoffs.  Strategic bid for part of company. 
28.  UMM buys Jonathan Logan (over unsuccessful defensive LBO). 
Equity  about  $196  million;  debt  $18  million;  premium $16  million. 
Selloffs  of  $17  million.  Substantial  layoffs  but most  appear to be  at 
UMM rather than Jonathan Logan.  UMM did phase out ladies'  apparel 
division  of  JL.  Pension  transfer of  $15  million.  UMM  has some  tax 
losses.  Pension  transfer along with better use of tax losses  can explain 
the small  premium here,  although the original  motives  seem  to have 
been  strategic. 
29.  Joy Technologies  makes a defensive LBO of Joy Man4facturing. 
Equity $620  million; debt $96 million; premium $229 million.  Selloffs 
are at least $252  million  plus assumption of some liabilities.  Retained 
divisions  represent at least 75 percent of pre-acquisition  operating in- 
come. No evidence of layoffs.  Approximately $400 million in additional 
debt taken on,  so tax benefits may be important. Motivation  for LBO 
is to remain independent; premium can probably be explained by prof- 
itable partial bustup coupled  with tax benefits. 
30.  Burlington Industries buys Masland.  Equity $117  million; debt 
$19.5  million; premium $42 million.  No selloffs.  No layoffs.  Strategic 
acquisition.  After  Burlington  LBO in  1988,  Masland division  put on 
the block.  It is sold for $79 million plus $66 million in preferred stock. 
Burlington  lost  $80  million  around the announcement of  its bid. 
31.  Laidlaw tries unsuccessfully  to buy Mayflower. Equity $260 mil- 
lion,  debt  $60  million;  premium $63  million.  Defensive  response  of 
Mayflower is a leveraged recapitalization.  Approximately $150 million 
in additional  long-term  debt after two  years.  Selloffs  of  $25  million. 
Layoffs  of  125 people bring savings of $24 million-63  million in pres- 
ent-value  terms.  Also,  may  be  exploiting  unused  debt capacity  in  a 
low-risk mature firm (school bus operator). Layoffs and debt tax shields 
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as Laidlaw and Mayflower  are the two biggest  firms in the school  bus 
business. 
32.  Cooper  Industries  buys McGraw-Edison.  Equity  $1.1  billion; 
debt $300 million; premium $410 million.  Selloffs  of $177 million that 
can be identified; Moody  says  $260  million.  In either case,  keep vast 
majority of assets.  Some layoffs  at a McGraw-Edison unit headquarters 
and some  plant shutdowns.  Strategic  acquisition  with some  evidence 
of restructuring. 
33.  Amalgamated  Sugar  (Harold  Simmons) buys Medford.  Equity 
$108  million;  debt $37  million;  premium $49  million.  Selloffs  of $38 
million.  Large stepup in harvesting  trees.  Probably a similar story to 
Pacific Lumber. Either underpriced or underutilized timber resources. 
Is there a general violation  of Hotelling  pricing of timber or just a lot 
of heterogeneity  in types  of timber, tree growth rates, and so forth? 
34.  Occidental  Petroleum  buys MidCon as  a  white knight.  Equity 
$3.1  billion;  debt $800  million;  premium $1.4  billion.  Selloffs  of  at 
least $1.47  billion.  Layoffs of 2,000,  saving between $152 million and 
$400 million  in present-value  terms. Approximately  $80 million cut in 
capital expenditure.  Not  clear these  layoffs  and capital spending cuts 
are abnormal given  what is happening in the industry right around the 
time of the acquisition.  Appears to be a strategically  motivated acqui- 
sition  with  Oxy  trying to acquire pipelines  to transport its gas.  Later 
Oxy  loses  civil  lawsuit  saying  that tried to  monopolize  regional  gas 
distribution through MidCon acquisition.  Oxy's  market value declines 
by $365 million on announcement of Midcon bid; fits with Oxy's typical 
pattern. 
35.  National  Gypsum LBO (defensive  against  Wickes). Equity $1.6 
billion;  debt  $120  million;  premium $325  million.  Assume  approxi- 
mately $1.3  billion  in additional long-term debt.  Fairly slow  debt re- 
duction over time.  Selloffs  of at least $441  million.  No layoffs  we can 
identify.  Cut investment  from $91  million  to  $24  million.  Not  clear 
that this is wasteful investment.  Tax savings from higher debt can justify 
much of the premium.  Free cash flow  story may be important. 
36.  Harold  Simmons buys NL Industries  after unsuccessful  bid by 
Coniston.  Offers $900  million  for the firm (plus debt of $231 million), 
but ends up buying control of the firm on the open market. Firm consists 
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business.  As a defensive  response NL has spun off NL Chemicals  with 
most of its cash flow going  to a new class  of preferred stock.  Initially 
Simmons purchases 51 percent of the parent firm (supposedly obtaining 
control  and cash  flow  claims  to  oil  business)  and 20  percent  of  the 
preferred stock  with cash  flow claims  to chemical  business.  Premium 
in this initial purchase is negligible  or negative.  Ultimately,  Simmons 
is after the chemical  business  and over time accumulates a majority of 
the preferred stock.  His attempts to sell  off  chemicals  to his own firm 
fail despite having 51 percent of the votes in the parent. In the meantime, 
the chemicals  business  (primarily titanium dioxide)  is taking off due to 
shortages,  and a subsequent  LBO offer  of  $915  million  for chemical 
subsidiary alone  is rejected as too low.  No  selloffs.  Pension  plan ter- 
minated: $81 million received  after tax. Employment falls very sharply 
in the  petroleum  business,  but this  is  typical  of  the whole  industry. 
Pension transfer can explain the premium, but most likely the company 
was significantly underpriced because the potential of chemical business 
was  not appreciated by the market. At least  this seems  to be what is 
motivating  Simmons. 
37.  Wickes tries  unsuccessfully  to buy Owens Corning Fiberglass. 
Equity $2.1  billion;  debt $540  million; premium $528  million.  Defen- 
sive  response  of  Owens  is  leveraged  recapitalization/share  buyback. 
Take on  $2  billion  in additional  debt,  but pay down  about $1  billion 
of  that within  one  to two  years.  After three years  still  have  approxi- 
mately $800  million  in additional debt.  Selloffs  at least $501  million; 
$679  million  according  to Moody's.  Layoffs  of 480  R&D personnel; 
also  early retirement of  373  at headquarters. Estimated present value 
of saving from research personnel layoffs  alone is between $91 million 
and $240 million.  There is some evidence that Owens has been spending 
a  lot  on  research  without  significant  results.  Early retirements  save 
perhaps  another  $70  million-$186  million.  Also  significant  capital 
spending cuts. Can trace approximately $30 million a year of those cuts 
to  nondivested  businesses.  Motivation  of  Wickes  is  a little  unclear. 
Owens  defensive  restructuring works to boost share price even  a little 
above  the  level  of  the  bid.  Research  and headquarters employment 
reductions,  some  tax savings  from increased debt,  and elimination  of 
possibly  wasteful  capital expenditures  can probably explain  this. 
38.  Maxxam  buys Pacific  Lumber.  Equity $870  million;  debt $46 
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of $50 million  from pension plan. Sharply step up cutting old redwood 
trees,  which  the  previous  management  left  untouched.  Employment 
rises  to  accommodate  higher  output.  Subsequent  appraisal of  timber 
assets at $2. 1 billion.  A little unclear how much this is case of timber 
assets  being  underpriced by  the stock  market and how  much the old 
management  was  wasting  by  harvesting  too  slowly.  There  is  some 
evidence  for the view that the old management's  slow harvesting policy 
was suboptimal. 
39.  Pickens  tries  unsuccessfully  to buy Phillips  Petroleum  (Icahn 
also  involved).  Equity $8.5  billion; debt $2.84  billion; premium $1.22 
billion.  Defensive  response  of  Phillips  is  leveraged  recapitalization/ 
share buyback plan. Assumed  approximately $3.7  billion of additional 
debt.  Three years later still  had $2 billion  in additional debt.  Selloffs 
at least  $2 billion.  Sharp exploration  cutbacks.  Large layoffs  (saving 
between $467 million and $1.23  billion in present-value terms). Pension 
excess  of  $400  million.  Possibly  utilization  of  unused  debt capacity 
(tax  shields).  Premium can  be  explained  by  layoffs  and cutbacks  in 
wasteful exploration,  although there is a big question about how much 
would have been cut even without takeover threat. Post-recapitalization 
projections for exploration  spending do not contain severe cuts but talk 
about the possibility  of such cuts if oil prices fall substantially (which 
happened  in the  year  after the  recap).  Taxes  may  also  be  important 
here: not only  exploitation  of  unused debt capacity,  but also  Pickens 
may have been interested in spinning off  oil  and gas properties into a 
partnership or trust to avoid double  taxation. 
40.  Edelman buys Ponderosa  after another takeover bid is defeated. 
Equity $280 million; debt $48 million; premium $68 million.  Assumed 
about $270  million  in additional debt.  Selloffs  of  $17  million  not in- 
cluding  sale of office  building,  corporate jet,  and art collection;  other 
planned selloffs  failed.  Headquarters layoffs  save between  $22.8  mil- 
lion  and $60  million  in present value.  Cut capital spending from $63 
million to $20 million.  Sold whole company to Metromedia in 1988 at 
a small loss  rather than put in a mere $8 million-$10  million  more in 
equity capital.  Apparently intended more piecemeal  selloffs,  although 
layoffs  and debt tax  shields  should  easily  explain  the premium with 
unclear value enhancement  role for capital spending cuts. 
41.  Gulf and Western buys Prentice Hall.  Equity $705 million; debt 
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No  layoffs,  no selloffs.  Strategic bid: both companies  are publishers. 
42.  Citicorp  buys Quotron.  Equity $680  million;  debt $7  million; 
premium $137  million.  No  selloffs.  No  layoffs.  Strategic acquisition 
fits Citicorp's  plan to move  into information services. 
43.  Pantry Pride  buys Revlon.  Equity $1.8  billion;  debt $485  mil- 
lion;  premium  $256  million.  Selloffs  of  assets  are at  $2.06  billion 
largely  to  strategic  buyers  in the  health  care business,  but the  main 
cosmetics  business  is  kept.  Rejects  offer  to  sell  cosmetics  for  $905 
million.  Revlon  also has $420 million  in cash.  Classic bustup although 
may have also improved cosmetics  operations.  Allegedly  the cosmetic 
business  received  the  attention  and resources  (advertising  budget)  it 
needed  after health care business  was sold off. 
44.  Procter  and Gamble buys Richardson-Vicks  as a white knight. 
Equity  $1.66  billion;  debt  $170  million;  premium $776  million,  but 
P&G loses $165 million on the announcement. Approximately $1 billion 
in additional long-term debt is assumed by P&G and this is not reduced 
in the two  years  after the acquisition.  Selloffs  at least  $106  million. 
No  layoffs  even  though  there was  some  talk about efficiencies  from 
combining sales forces.  Take on $1.5  billion in debt. Clearly a strategic 
acquisition.  P&G wants international distribution channels of Richard- 
son-Vicks  to increase  sales  of  its products overseas  and wants to use 
its own bargaining power in purchasing advertising to benefit R-V prod- 
ucts in U.S. 
45.  HV Homes  (a  limited partnership)  buys Ryan Homes.  Equity 
$330  million;  debt $18  million;  premium $64 million.  No selloffs.  No 
layoffs.  Conversion  to  limited  partnership has  large  tax  benefits,  as 
does  the increase  in debt.  Also,  acquirer argued that strategic consid- 
erations are important. Tax savings can explain the premium, however. 
46.  KKR buys Safeway as a white knight defense against Dart Group 
bid. Equity $4.2 billion; debt $1.1 billion; premium $1.5 billion.  Layoff 
of  300  HQ staff  for a saving  of between  $57  and $150  million  in PV 
terms.  Selloffs  of at least  $3.2  billion.  Stores representing at least 70 
percent of  sales  are kept.  Sold-off  stores  seem  to be the higher labor 
cost  stores  (depending  on  local  union  and labor market conditions). 
Some concerns that union workers will be squeezed.  Also, each regional 
piece  of the firm seems  to be sold  to other players with lots of  stores 
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perhaps with the intention of raising market power.  Taxes and layoffs 
alone cannot explain  the premium; bustup must be important. 
47.  Marriott  buys Saga.  Equity  $502  million;  debt  $105  million; 
premium $148 million,  but Marriott loses $162 million in value. Selloffs 
of $306  million.  Combined  operations and support staff but no layoff 
numbers are available.  Keeps  foodservice  business.  Strategic  bid for 
part of the company. 
48.  Lockheed  buys Sanders  Associates  as  a  white  knight.  Equity 
$1. 18 billion;  debt $19  million;  premium $614  million.  Some layoffs, 
but small  relative to the premium.  No  selloffs.  Strategic bid,  both do 
defense. 
49.  Hanson  Trust buys SCM. Equity $927.5  million; debt $261 mil- 
lion; premium $386  million.  Selloffs  of at least $900.2  million  mostly 
to strategic buyers,  but kept typewriter division  and titanium dioxide 
assets  representing  almost  50 percent of  pre-acquisition  operating in- 
come.  No  evidence  of layoffs.  Seems  like  a clear bustup. 
50.  First  City Properties  buys Scovill.  Equity  $540  million;  debt 
$87 million; premium $212 million.  Selloffs  of at least $680.7  million, 
but a division  with  book  value  of  assets  of  over  $100  million  and at 
least 25 percent of pre-acquisition  operating profit is retained. Cuts in 
corporate staff of 30-35  percent as well,  exact numbers are not known. 
The crown jewels  of Scovill  (Nutone and Yale Security) were sold off 
about 2.5  years after the acquisition  near the market's peak (and ac- 
counted for $480  million  of the proceeds  from selloffs). 
51.  Burlington  Northern  buys  Southland  Royalty  (after  the latter 
tries to reorganize  as a limited partnership  to reduce tax bill).  Equity 
$695  million;  debt $339  million;  premium $126  million,  but BN loses 
$97  million  in value.  No selloffs.  Big reductions in BN pipeline work 
force (30 percent),  unclear how  many from Southland Royalty.  Some 
investment reductions.  Layoffs  and investment cuts are quite typical of 
the entire  industry around this  time.  Motive  appears to be  strategic; 
Southland is a big supplier to BN's  pipelines.  Burlington falls by almost 
full  amount of  premium  paid  for  Southland.  Eventually,  Burlington 
Northern spins off  Southland Royalty  and other natural resources into 
Burlington  Resources,  a limited  partnership when it itself  becomes  a 
target. 70  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
52.  Burroughs buys Sperry. Equity $4.44  billion; debt $1.03  billion; 
premium $1.22  billion.  Selloffs  of at least $1.8  billion.  Layoffs  of at 
least  2,370  for a saving  of  $180  million  to $474  million.  Actual em- 
ployment reductions are much bigger than layoffs, at least 10,000 through 
early retirement, attrition, and layoff.  That means total savings of $760 
million  to $2 billion.  Employment  cutbacks are a big source of  gain. 
Also,  other efficiencies,  including a purchase of inputs. Allegedly  save 
$100  million  per year before  tax by getting  the better of  each of  the 
firm's previous deals with individual input suppliers.  Layoffs  and pur- 
chasing  efficiencies  realized  can clearly  explain  the premium. 
53.  Berry tries unsuccessfully to buy Strawbridge & Clothier. Equity 
$375 million; debt $105 million; premium $55 million.  No selloffs.  No 
layoffs.  Bidder has a board seat  already and wants specific  changes, 
such as financing of receivables  and expansion  of the discount  chain, 
but the family  in power refuses to do it. Looks like potential efficiency 
improvement opposed by the founding family.  Berry may just be trying 
to put Strawbridge in play; there is evidence  that he had little prospect 
of lining  up necessary  financing. 
54.  Bethlehem Steel  buys Tull Industries as a white knight. Equity 
$96  million;  debt $10  million;  premium $26  million.  No  selloffs.  No 
layoffs  (there are layoffs  at Bethlehem,  but they are probably not from 
Tull).  Motives  are probably Bethlehem's  tax loss  carryforwards and 
Tull's  profitability,  as  well  as  strategic.  However,  a  year  after  the 
acquisition,  Tull is sold for $100  million  to Inland Steel,  the original 
suitor, for $100 million.  Inland Steel also has tax losses.  This is largely 
a tax deal with some  strategic overtones. 
55.  Crane buys Unidynamics as a white knight. Equity $188.5  mil- 
lion;  debt  $62.5  million;  premium $99  million,  and Crane loses  $15 
million  in  value.  Some  selloffs;  amounts  not  reported.  No  layoffs. 
Pension reversion of $18 million.  Diversification.  Crane is after defense 
business  of Unidynamics  to augment its own and diversify  away from 
cyclical  high-fixed-cost  industries in which  it mostly  operates. 
56.  GAF  unsuccessfully  tries  to  buy  Union  Carbide.  Equity  $5.6 
billion;  debt $2.4  billion;  premium $1.34  billion.  Defensive  response 
of Carbide is leveraged recapitalization/share buyback. Selloffs  (mostly 
of sought after consumer brand names) are at least $4.5  billion.  Present 
value of savings from white-collar  layoffs  is $760 million to $2 billion. Sanjai  Bhagat, Andrei  Shleifer,  and Robert  Vishny  71 
Remove  $500  million  in excess  assets from the pension plan. Interest- 
ingly,  UC first buys back its equity at a high price and issues debt, but 
several  months later issues  new equity  at low  prices and retires debt. 
This has a massive  cost  to the company  and shareholders who stayed 
on.  White-collar  layoffs  and pension transfer can probably explain the 
premium,  but selloffs  of  consumer  business  were probably profitable 
as well. 
57.  Clayton-Dubilier  buys  Uniroyal  Tire in an LBO.  Equity $746 
million;  debt $255  million;  premium $234  million.  Also  $300  million 
underfunding in the pension plan. Selloffs  of at least $935 million,  but 
the main tire division  is kept.  The tire division  accounts  for roughly 
one-third of operating profit in the pre-acquisition  firm. Present value 
of savings  from layoffs  is $112  million-$240  million.  A bustup, with 
important savings  from layoffs. 
58.  Mesa  Partners  (Pickens)  unsuccessfully  tries  to  buy  Unocal. 
Equity $9.2 billion; debt $1.3 billion; premium $2.21  billion.  Defensive 
response  by  Unocal  is  a discriminatory  (against  Pickens)  leveraged 
recapitalization/share buyback. Take on $4.5  billion in additional debt. 
Three years later,  still has over $3 billion  in additional debt.  Spin off 
45 percent of oil  and gas properties into master limited partnership to 
avoid  corporate  tax.  Selloffs  of  under $40  million.  Layoffs  of  600 
employees,  not  counting  early  retirements,  has  the present  value  of 
savings  between  $45 million  and $120  million.  With early retirements 
and a hiring freeze,  Forbes estimates  $60  million  per year before tax, 
which is between $1 10 million and $300 million in present-value terms. 
Capital expenditures  cut $500  million  per year,  although this is quite 
typical for the whole  industry during this period. Debt tax shield along 
with  tax  benefits  from  limited  partnership can  explain  large  part of 
premium given that Unocal  is not paying down its debt quickly through 
asset selloffs,  although the investment  cut is probably also important. 
59.  Hanson  Trust buys  US Industries  (response  to MBO proposal 
at  very low price).  Equity  $511  million;  debt $61  million;  premium 
$196  million.  Selloffs  of  $178  million.  Lays  off  400  employees  for 
saving  of  $30  million-$80  million  in present value  terms.  This  is  a 
partial bustup with important savings from layoffs  and possibly  unused 
debt capacity  (tax shields). 
60.  APL Partnership  buys Van Dusen Air. Equity $63 million; debt 72  Brookings  Papers:  Microeconomics  1990 
$14 million;  premium $14 million.  No layoffs.  Sell for $101.5  million 
an aviation service  division  that is 80 percent of revenues.  It is sold to 
a strategic buyer. Keep remaining assets and put them in tax advantaged 
limited  partnership. This is a bustup-tax  savings  situation. 
61.  Marine Midland Bank buys Westchester Financial  Services.  Eq- 
uity $102  million; premium $35 million.  No selloffs.  No layoffs.  Stra- 
tegic. 
62.  Electrolux  buys White Consolidated.  Equity $743  million; debt 
$180 million; premium $164 million.  No selloffs.  No layoffs.  Strategic 
acquisition  whereby  Electrolux  tries to enter U.S.  appliance industry. Comments 
and Discussion 
Comment  by Gregg Jarrel:  As George Stigler told me at the University 
of Chicago,  "The plural of anecdote is data. " This paper is an excellent 
illustration of that statement.  Several conclusions  come out of the au- 
thors' discussion  that bear emphasis.  The first is that loosening  antitrust 
policies  was the basic regulatory spur to the merger-and-takeover boom 
of the  1980s.  I do not know if that is a valid conclusion,  but it is the 
conclusion  of this paper, and I agree with it. 
The second  conclusion  is that the theory free cash flow receives  is 
trivial.  The authors concede  that in the oil and gas industry the theory 
has  some  explanatory  power,  but  that is  as  far as  it  goes.  Michael 
Jensen's  investigation  of the industry motivated him to come  up with 
the theory in the first place.  He will  be disappointed in the conclusion 
here,  especially  since  in a recent article he argued that KKR is going 
to take over the United  States.' 
Those  are my broad comments,  but I have some  specific  questions 
and criticisms.  Is the rate or the amount of selloffs  directly related to 
the burden of leverage?  How precisely  is that measured? How far did 
the authors go  to test that obvious  empirical  prediction? 
I am also troubled by the measurement of premiums of the firms that 
remain independent.  That is not nearly as easy  as measuring the pre- 
miums of the takeover targets that are successfully  bought out.  There 
is a big bag of  money,  and it can be measured and the measurement 
expressed  as a fraction of  something.  So,  the researcher goes  back in 
time to find the right base. 
1.  Jensen (1988). 
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A firm that remains  independent  sometimes  does  so using  a lever- 
aged-recap  transaction.  But  sometimes  it  defeats  the  offer  by  legal 
means.  I wonder  whether the cases  here represent the former or the 
latter and whether the authors had any difficulties  with them? 
Also,  did  the  authors  find  that the  white  knight  cases  had  more 
frequent negative  returns to bidders relative  to the target gains? That 
finding comes  out  of  the literature and is  normally  expressed  as the 
"winner's  curse"  hypothesis-that  the bidders that win auction con- 
tests  for control  do worse  than the bidders that had negotiated  agree- 
ments.  Normally  white knights,  almost by definition,  win auctions,  at 
least as auctions  are defined in this particular area. 
A related question:  are the conclusions  sensitive  to whether the au- 
thors used the takeover premiums to table 2 or the total in table 2? The 
total in table 2 takes account of the bidder returns, so the total takeover 
premium  is  measured.  That is  one  potential  measure  as a base.  The 
other measure nets out the return to the bidders. 
It is  my  experience  that bidder returns are measured with  a great 
deal more error than are target returns. The best a researcher can do is 
hope to get large samples.  With this particular approach in table 2 the 
authors are asking  a great deal  from their statistical  methods  on  the 
bidder's  side,  to go  in on a case-by-case  basis  and try to understand 
what the market had to say about the bidder's  reaction to a particular 
event  and then netting that out of the takeover premium. 
One  approach would  be  to  say,  "I  do  not know  in any particular 
case if the market has any idea what it is doing in revaluing the bidder; 
I  am  going  to  assume  the  excess  bidder return is  zero  and use  the 
takeover premiums and the targets as a base. " It is a substitute approach. 
It would  be  nice  to  know  if  the conclusions  remain valid  under this 
substitute approach. 
A  related  question  is  what  is  the  relative  size  in these  particular 
cases?  How  big  are these  bidders relative  to the targets? There are a 
lot  of  data problems  on  the bidders'  side.  There are a lot  of  bidders 
that are not measurable because  they are shell  firms that do not really 
trade. The bidders that are measurable sometimes are very large relative 
to the target.  A reader does  not know  what is being  discounted  with 
the bidders relative to the target. Maybe the bidders have been looking 
for  firms that  are like  this  target before,  so  the  market has  already 
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Comment  by  Lawrence  Summers:  Sanjai Bhagat,  Andrei Shleifer, 
and Robert Vishny  are to be congratulated on an impressive paper that 
reveals  a great deal of hard work.  They have examined  62 takeovers, 
studying carefully  the journalistic  accounts of what took place. 
Because  I harbor the suspicion that Business  Week and the New York 
Times may be more accurate in the coverage of corporate America than 
they are in their coverage  of the nation's economics  departments, it is 
with some  scepticism  that I think one has to take their results.  Clearly 
if  one  wants  to  study  62  companies,  there  is  no  alternative  to  the 
approach the authors pursue,  but my confidence  in the results  would 
have been greatly enhanced  if they were also  able to report on actual 
discussions  and actual investigations  with the people involved  in some 
of their transactions so as to corroborate the method that was used. 
The paper presents  information that is new,  bearing in one way or 
the other on three potential  sources  of  value  in takeovers: tax advan- 
tages,  layoffs,  and selloffs.  I want to discuss their analysis of each and 
then  offer  some  broader observations  about the  desirability  or  lack 
thereof of  hostile  takeovers  as an agent of change. 
The authors attribute some  importance to the effects  of tax advan- 
tages,  stressing the role of debt and the interest deductability as a source 
of  value  in  premiums  and noting  that the  analysis  by  Auerbach  and 
Reishus  dismissed  the effect  of taxes.1 The analysis  is largely  suspect 
because Auerbach and Reishus focused  on only a single tax effect: the 
ability to combine  losses  with profits. Everybody  agrees that is not of 
great  importance.  I  suspect  that Bhagat,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  here 
understate the importance of  taxes for four reasons.  First, contrary to 
their assertion,  it does  not really  matter whether the debt involved  in 
a takeover is paid back or is not paid back. Imagine that an acquisition 
is financed with debt and that the assets are then sold to some company 
that pays for them with cash out of its treasury. The government loses 
the interest deductions  that used to cost  the government revenue.  The 
government  now  loses  that revenue  in  the  form  of  smaller  interest 
earnings from the treasury of a company that made the acquisition.  It 
is only  if  new  equity  is  issued  to  finance acquisitions  and is used  to 
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pay back debt that it is  inappropriate to use the full  permanent value 
of the debt in measuring tax advantages. 
Second,  modern financial technology  permits interest deductions that 
substantially  exceed  true interest payments on high-technology  bonds 
and other sophisticated  financial instruments that carry high yields.  The 
tax yield  in the early years substantially exceeds  the true interest cost. 
To that extent,  the tax benefit of  the deduction  is understated by the 
authors' procedure of simply using the value of the debt. To think about 
that, just  take the example  of  a 20-year junk bond that carries an  18 
percent interest rate but which, nonetheless,  has a negligible  probability 
of defaulting  in the first year. The true interest cost  in the first year is 
9 percent.  The true deduction  that is taken is a certain fraction of  18 
percent. The value of the deduction exceeds  the tax rate times the value 
of the actual interest payment.  To that extent the tax saving  is under- 
stated. 
Third,  the authors-because  they cannot say much about it-slide 
quickly over the General Utilities  aspect and the step-up of bases, which 
is regarded by practitioners as being  of very considerable  importance 
in a number of transactions. 
Finally,  they  make  no  mention  of  the  avoidance  of  dividend  tax 
liabilities  that takes place  as a consequence  of  these repurchases and 
in a period when capital gains are preferentially taxed. They are a device 
for getting cash out of the corporate sector without paying the dividend 
taxes. 
Taking all of those  features together,  I suspect the taxes are subsi- 
dizing  these  transactions  to  a rather greater extent  than the  authors 
suggest. 
The authors come  next to the question of layoffs.  That is a slightly 
odd word for what is being discussed.  It has to be acknowledged  that 
if  one  believed  that these  transactions  were  substantially  increasing 
efficiency,  the way in which they would do that is by getting the same 
amount done  with  fewer  people  working.  So,  the reallocation  of  re- 
dundant employees  would  be another term that one could use. 
The authors do not really pursue the idea that Andrei Shleifer and I 
had discussed  in our earlier work, which was that there was an element 
of expropriation of stakeholders  involved.  The extent to which that is 
true depends  on whether the displaced  employees  get new jobs  at the 
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all. It would have been interesting to have had some hint or information 
about the extent to which the efficiency  gained from these layoffs  was 
matched by a loss  to those  who had been laid off. 
Second,  I suspect the authors understate the amount of reduced em- 
ployment  that is a consequence  of these  transactions.  I take it that to 
qualify in their sample a firm has to announce in the Wall Street Journal 
that it is going  to have  a layoff.  If it simply  increases  the generosity 
of  its early retirement plan or increases  employment  less  rapidly than 
it had intended,  it does  not qualify  and probably will  not get  in the 
Wall Street Journal with that news.  And to that extent it will be missed 
in their analysis. 
Third, the authors' procedure for discounting the layoffs is odd. They 
use  a  10 percent discount  rate,  and they  say,  "Well,  you  can get  to 
that conclusion  two ways.  You can suppose that there is no inflation, 
that wages  will  not grow  at the rate of  inflation; or you can suppose 
that an 8 percent risk premium is appropriate." However risky General 
Electric may be,  I would assume that the cost saving from firing 1,000 
people  is roughly constant.  It knows  what that cost saving is,  and it is 
not uncertain about what the benefit from that cash flow will  be in the 
future. To that extent,  the layoff should be discounted at a riskless rate. 
Since  we  are talking  about that,  changing  the discount  rate from  10 
percent to 3 percent triples the amount,  and that would be enough  to 
substantially  alter the authors' conclusions. 
All of that said, what is on the other side? The authors acknowledge 
that they do not do much with the fact that presumably even  the em- 
ployees  that could be laid off were contributing something beforehand. 
So,  assuming  that these  employees  were purely deadwood  and all of 
the labor costs  were treated as an efficiency  improvement is probably 
not appropriate. 
The authors also take no account of another possible  expropriation, 
namely growth in wages that is slower than would otherwise have taken 
place,  similarly  for bargaining with suppliers and the like. 
In the end there are substantial biases going  in both directions,  so it 
is difficult to know which way one would want to correct the authors' 
estimates.  My  own  best  guess  would  be  that the value  of  the labor- 
saving costs is substantially greater than the authors suggest.  However, 
there are probably also costs to not having that labor around any more, 
which the authors do not take any account of. 78  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1990 
The central conclusion  of the paper, and by far the most interesting 
part, is the analysis  summarized in table 8. It is a commentary on both 
table 8 and tables  1 through 7 that about 60 percent of the value added 
of the paper is contained in table 8, which illustrates that a large fraction 
of the assets  that are involved  in takeover transactions end up getting 
sold to other public corporations in industries closely  related to those 
industries where the assets  were already being deployed. 
I think Gregg  Jarrell was correct to suggest  that the eclipse  of  the 
public corporation perhaps has lasted about as long as the typical eclipse 
lasts.  The authors' analysis does suggest  that these transactions do not 
primarily represent disincorporation.  And there is a great deal of  an- 
ecdotal evidence  to suggest  the the type of effect they are talking about 
is  correctly  observed.  I recall  the CEO of  one  major bank observing 
that "of  course,  our bank would be worth more broken up, but fortu- 
nately  banking  regulations  make a hostile  acquisition  impossible,  so 
we will  remain a valuable  organization  for the foreseeable  future." 
Other chief  operating  officers  are happy to explain  in private that 
they  have  engaged  in the exercise  of  shopping  around individual  di- 
visions  of  their company  and that when  they  do  that,  the combined 
value of individual  divisions  is two or three times the current value of 
their company.  I usually refrain from asking them what they think about 
the market's implicit  verdict on their managerial ability,  sitting on top 
of these valuable  assets. 
It does  seem  as if busting up assets  and allocating  them separately 
to different people is a major source of value. That conclusion,  I think, 
has not received  enough  attention and is the major contribution of the 
paper. The question  one  has to ask is: Why is this so? Why is it that 
reallocating assets produces such substantial contributions, apparently, 
or increases  in value? 
Let me just comment on four possible explanations.  The first is what 
I would call the " winner's curse"  aspect. Imagine that the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art could be put on sale in two different ways.  In one case 
the whole museum would be put on sale.  In the other case the paintings 
would be put on sale separately.  I would imagine that the value fetched 
would  be  substantially  greater in the second  case  because  the people 
who  liked  a given  painting  would  compete  to buy it,  and the total of 
these  individual  sales  would be greater than that of a block purchase. 
So, too,  if there are optimists about the steel industry or optimists about Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny  79 
the oil  industry.  Selling  steel  assets  and oil  assets  separately  would 
increase the total value of the assets that can be realized.  That may be 
why conglomerates  carry such low values.  There is no pure-play effect. 
Nobody  is going  to bet that everything  IT&T is doing  is going  to be 
good,  but one  can bet that car rental will  be good  or that some  other 
division  of the corporation will  be good. 
There  is,  however,  an  interesting  conflict  because  it  is  perfectly 
possible  that maximizing  value  by finding optimistic  buyers for each 
class  of  assets  will  lead to a different conclusion  than the conclusion 
of who can manage the assets  best.  It may well  be that breakups that 
allow optimists about each individual part to own that part will increase 
the value at which the assets can be sold,  even though people who buy 
them may not be those who are best able to operate them. Think about 
the sale of the paintings from the Metropolitan Museum.  Some of the 
people  who buy could  be very poor at appreciating art. 
A  second  hypothesis  suggested  by the conglomerate  experience  is 
that some  of these  transactions may involve  transfer of earnings from 
situations  in which  they carry a high price-earnings ratio to situations 
where they carry a low  ratio.  I have no evidence  on this point,  but it 
does  have  the  virtue  that one  could  potentially  get  evidence  on  it. 
Supporting the conglomerate  boom,  in significant part, was that these 
conglomerates  had high price-earnings ratios and other companies  had 
low price-earnings  ratios.  When the conglomerates  purchased compa- 
nies and got more earnings,  those extra earnings carried the same old 
price-earnings ratio that the conglomerate had had before. It is the same 
factor that explains  why  any American company  that can will  have  a 
subsidiary issue  equity  in Japan right now. 
Perhaps what  is  going  on  is  that these  transactions are taking  the 
form of brokering earnings from places  where they have a low  price- 
earnings ratio to places where they have a high ratio. Those differences 
in price-earnings ratios may reflect rational expectations  about the abil- 
ity of management to increase earnings. They may simply reflect market 
conventions  for valuing  different  companies  that are slow  to change. 
The same CEO who admitted to me that if his company sold its divisions 
separately the total price would  be two or three times  the company's 
current value  also  confessed  to be spending  some  amount of his time 
endeavoring to speak with Standard and Poor about getting his company 
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to be in had a price-earnings  ratio that was 30 percent greater than the 
industry  that he  was  now  in.  I think  it  is  unlikely  that that was  an 
entirely  futile  exercise,  if  he  could  have  pulled  it off.  And,  to  that 
extent,  reallocations  may be in order. 
A third reason that reallocating  assets produces increases in value is 
that the transactions are all coming  at the hands of the people who put 
up the debt. Any idiot who called himself  a condo minimum developer 
in Boston  in the four years before a year and a half ago,  or who called 
himself  any kind  of  real estate  developer  and bought  properties and 
painted them or did almost anything, made a spectacular rate of return. 
During the period when these takeovers yielded very substantial value, 
the stock market roughly tripled.  If one simply bought the S & P 500 
stocks on 25 percent margins, one would have seen the money increase 
tenfold.  Not  even  the KKR buyout fund has turned in such a perfor- 
mance. 
I suspect  that a large  part of  the  success  in buying  divisions  and 
selling  those divisions  separately has been partly the result of getting 
on a fast-moving  escalator.  But if the escalator slows down, who loses? 
It is  the people  who  put up the debt and will  not be in a position  to 
collect.  There is substantial evidence that, at least in the last six months, 
people who had put up debt in the preceding year are finding that action 
a very expensive  mistake.  So it may well  be that a source of value in 
these transactions is that people have been allowed to borrow on margin 
to buy stock  at an excessively  favorable rate. 
Finally,  there is the question of market power,  and here I would just 
highlight  an observation  that Michael  Salinger made years ago.  If you 
really think that firms have roughly constant returns of scale  and that 
a little  bit of  market power  will  translate into a great deal of  value, 
then let me give  a simple  example.  It is not wildly  wrong to say that 
the typical  firm has a market value  roughly  equal to the value  of  its 
sales.  Imagine  that its elasticity  of  demand changes  from five to six. 
That is not a change of spectacular magnitude. The change in the markup 
will  be  about 3.33  percent of  sales.  This  percentage,  for most com- 
panies,  is a substantial share-perhaps  a third, perhaps more-of  prof- 
its,  so the implied increase in market value would then be one-third to 
one-half.  Thus  even  very  small  changes  in the relevant elasticity  of 
demand can account for very substantial increases in market value. And 
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I would  be very surprised if a closer  investigation  than the one  the 
authors carry out would  suggest  that a large fraction of the divisional 
sales  that they report would  in fact have been stopped by the antitrust 
authorities at the average moment from between  1950 and 1980.  The 
suggestion  that antitrust relaxation  as a major force  behind what has 
happened is unsupported by evidence  does  not really accord with my 
intuition. 
Finally,  about the public-policy  tilt that all of  this suggests:  econ- 
omists  generally  believe  that interference with the markets should not 
be based on how good or how bad some trading commodity  is but only 
on the external consequences  of various activities.  So,  I looked  at the 
analysis in this paper with a view to trying to determine what the external 
benefits and costs were, as distinct from the benefits and costs that were 
realized  directly  by the parties to these  transactions.  As  best  I could 
judge,  whatever  efficiency  consequences  there  were  in  the  form  of 
economies  of scale  would be captured by the parties to takeover trans- 
actions.  On the other hand, potential other sources of value-lost  tax 
revenue,  reductions  in the value  of  human capital,  sales  people  who 
were not smart and paid the wrong price-would  all be imposing  neg- 
ative,  external costs  to those who were not involved  in the transaction. 
And to that extent and to the extent that the authors have not suggested 
any important external  benefits  to these  transactions,  it seems  to me 
that the analysis pointed in the direction of a policy tilt toward reducing 
the number of hostile  takeovers. 
General  Discussion:  An issue  that particularly interested the par- 
ticipants was the increased postmerger profits that seemed to result from 
a horizontal acquisition.  Lawrence White alleged that it is often difficult 
to tell whether these higher profits come from increased market power 
or decreased costs.  This was a serious issue for many of the participants 
because  of  the  implications  for  antitrust enforcement.  According  to 
White the authors claim that antitrust enforcement virtually stopped in 
the 1980s.  If these increased profits are, in fact, coming from enhanced 
market power,  this brings into question the policy  of reduced antitrust 
enforcement.  If,  on  the other hand,  they  are coming  from decreased 
costs-from  efficiency  gains-then  the new antitrust policies  might be 
performing as they were intended to.  White claimed that the 1982 and 
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focus  on where the threats of market power really came from.  Andrei 
Shleifer  said that the data used for the paper did not allow  for a dis- 
tinction  to be made between  monopoly  power and efficiency  gains. 
Michael  Whinston wanted more information about what features of 
hostile  takeovers  made  them  different  from friendly  ones,  since  the 
paper pointed out that, by and large,  both occur for strategic reasons. 
He was interested in a more substantial definition of the term "strategic 
takeover."  According to Whinston,  the authors apply this term to take- 
overs occurring for seemingly  different reasons: monopolization,  ver- 
tical  integration,  R&D  advantages,  and so  forth.  Shleiffer  replied by 
saying that the overwhelming  majority of things that the paper defines 
as  "strategic"  involve  horizontal  moves,  with only  one  or two  con- 
cerned with vertical  integration. 
Whinston  was  also  interested  in the  industrial organization  of  the 
brokerage market. He wondered if the final buyers of the firms involved 
in takeovers made money on the transaction, or if the brokers were able 
to successfully  extract all of  the rents.  He suggested  that the type of 
strategic acquisition-that  is, monopolization  or strategic advantage- 
might have an effect  on the amount of the rents that brokers would be 
able to extract. 
Oliver  Williamson  said that the evidence  brought out in the paper 
supports the theory of complacent  management.  He said that it is dif- 
ficult for management to "run a tight ship"  for an extended period of 
time. When aggressive  capital markets see this, a takeover occurs,  and 
belt-tightening  is instituted, which accounts for the takeover premiums. 
Richard Caves  said that the takeovers appear to be a mechanism by 
which  businesses  are transferred from corporations  with  which  they 
have  a bad fit to corporations  that can better manage them.  Shleiffer 
agreed with this and said that the evidence  presented in the paper was 
consistent  with the idea of  improving efficiency  by transferring assets 
to better managers in the same line of business  as those  assets. 
Margaret Blair said that more attention must be given  to free-cash- 
flow  theory.  She  asserted that free cash  flow was tied to the authors' 
claim that the abrogation of implicit employment  contracts is a source 
of takeover premiums. Blair said breaking such implicit contracts would 
be more likely  to occur when those contracts become  inconsistent  with 
profit maximization,  that is,  when they represent inappropriate use of 
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Martin Baily  asked  if  the journalistic  accounts  used  in  the  paper 
constituted data. Sanjai Bhagat responded by saying that they had used 
all publicly available published reports on layoffs,  selloffs,  and so forth. 
These included newspapers,  popular and trade magazines,  proxy state- 
ments,  annual reports,  lOK's,  and other sources. 
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